Politics across Generations: Family Transmission Reexamined

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We use longitudinal data incorporating three generations of Americans to reevaluate the character and consequences of political socialization within the family. Findings about parental influence based on youth coming of age in the 1990s strongly parallel those based on youth socialized in the 1960s. As expected on the basis of social learning theory, children are more likely to adopt their parents’ political orientations if the family is highly politicized and if the parents provide consistent cues over time. The direct transmission model is robust, as it withstands an extensive set of controls. Early acquisition of parental characteristics influences the subsequent nature of adult political development.

Writing 40 years ago, Jennings and Niemi (1968) questioned the conventional wisdom about the role of parents in shaping the political character of their children. Working from the perspective of social learning theory and drawing on data collected independently from adolescents and their parents, they demonstrated high variability in the political similarity between parents and their children. Especially when judged against the expectations laid down by reliance on retrospective accounts of parental attributes, the results appeared to downgrade the direct transmission model, wherein parental attributes were passed on, wittingly or unwittingly, to their offspring. These outcomes seemed all the more surprising in view of the considerable overall aggregate congruence between the two generations.

Somewhat lost in the (over) generalizations flowing out of this and related research were a number of important qualifications. Transmission rates tended to vary in a systematic fashion according to type of political trait. The more concrete, affect-laden, and central the object in question, the more successful was the transmission. More abstract, ephemeral, and historically conditioned attributes were much less successfully passed on. Salience of the political object for the parents was an important conditioner of successful reproduction, as was perceptual accuracy on the part of the child (Acock and Bengston 1980; Percheron and Jennings 1981; Tedin 1980; Westholm 1999). The presence of politically homogeneous parents, and other agents allied with the parents, enhanced the fidelity of transmission (Jennings and Niemi 1974, chap. 6; Tedin 1980). Contextual properties such as larger opinion climates (Jennings and Niemi 1974, 81–82, 161–62) and party systems (Westholm and Niemi 1992) also affected within-family consonance. These specifications and qualifications also lent support to social learning theory explanations of how children come to resemble their parents more in some respects than others. Although not in the tradition of the transmission model, but fully compatible with social learning theory, other inquiries have revealed the importance of communication patterns within the family in shaping the political make-up of the child (e.g., Tims 1986; Valentino and Sears 1998).

In this paper we return to the topic of intergenerational transmission informed by scholarship subsequent to the earlier research and enriched by the availability of additional data, as described below. We address four main questions, questions raised but not resolved by earlier work. In addressing these questions, we seek to contribute a fresher, more comprehensive understanding of intergenerational transmission, and of how early political socialization influences the dynamics of attitude formation and change over the life course.
The first question is whether past findings about intergenerational transmission are cohort-specific. Virtually all studies of adolescents and their parents originated between the mid 1960s and the 1970s. In particular, the Jennings and Niemi (1968) findings were based on pairs formed from high school seniors of 1965, a cohort coming of age during the heights of the civil rights movement and the war in Vietnam and one that experienced a number of uncommon and dramatic events during adolescence and young adulthood. Given these considerations, it has been suggested that the findings from the mid-1960s may be cohort-centric, that preceding and succeeding cohorts would exhibit different patterns of relationships, presumably including more faithful political reproduction of their parents (e.g., Sears and Funk 1999). Testing for cohortcentrism requires a replication of the research with a subsequent cohort of parent-child pairs, one where the offspring were socialized under quite different historical and familial circumstances. We respond by comparing parent-child transmission levels for the original Jennings/Niemi pairs with those for a new set of pairs, one where the children were coming of age in the mid 1980s to mid 1990s.

A second question concerns the circumstances under which parental influence is enhanced. Here we move beyond what transmission rates typically look like to consider processes that work to make transmission rates especially high or especially low. According to social learning theory, transmission success should vary according to the strength of cue giving and reinforcement on the part of the socializer. Previous research has typically evaluated this expectation by ascertaining if transmission rates are especially enhanced in highly politicized families. Our analysis revisits this question and adds a new perspective, capitalizing on the longitudinal design to evaluate how the over-time consistency of parental cue giving on specific political issues influences transmission success.

These first two questions stem from applying the standard transmission model, which views parent-child similarity as an outcome of social influence and learning processes operating within the home. These processes are assumed to rest on observational learning and its variants of modeling, imitation, and identification, all of which work to heighten reproductive fidelity along political lines. Yet parent-child agreement is not, itself, evidence that such transmission processes are operating. Children and parents may become politically similar because of other influences they share, including their socioeconomic circumstances and their local political contexts. Our third question, then, is to what extent does the transmission model survive once these alternative sources of parent-child similarity are taken into account? To answer this question we estimate multivariate models of youth attitudes that introduce additional parent, child, and school-level contextual explanatory variables.

The final question we take up involves the long-term consequences of early political socialization. How does the early acquisition of political characteristics, via family transmission, influence the child’s subsequent political development? Do those who leave home well-socialized differ later in life from those who do not? These are questions where the expectations are strong, but the existing evidence is weak. At a minimum, well-socialized youth should manifest more over-time continuity in their political orientations, withstanding the forces of change more than their less well-socialized counterparts. We evaluate this expectation by examining how patterns of political development over the adult life-span vary according to the success of parental transmission as of late adolescence.

### Study Design and Measures

We draw on a portion of the longitudinal parent-child political socialization project carried out by the University of Michigan’s Survey Research Center and Center for Political Studies (ICPSR study #9553, #4037, and #3926). The original core of the project consisted of interviews with a national sample of 1,669 high school seniors from the graduating class of 1965, distributed across 97 public and nonpublic schools chosen with probability proportionate to size (Jennings and Niemi, 1974, Appendix). Subsequent surveys conducted in 1973, 1982, and 1997 resulted in a four-wave panel of 935 individuals, which represents an overall, unadjusted retention rate of 56%.¹ During

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¹ All respondents were interviewed face-to-face in 1965, as were the great majority in 1973 and 1982, when an abbreviated mailback questionnaire was used for remotely located individuals. In 1997 approximately one-half of the interviews were face-to-face and the other half by telephone. Respondent bias across the four waves appears to be slight. The crucial comparison is between the 935 four-wave panel respondents and the 734 respondents surveyed in the 1965 study who dropped out in one of the post-1965 waves. The former had slightly higher scores on measures of political involvement as of 1965 and were slightly more liberal. However, panel status never accounts for over 2% of the variation in the scores of explicitly political measures.
the first three waves interviews were conducted with at least one parent, thereby enabling the construction of parent-child pairs as units of analysis. Altogether 636 pairs, based on Generations 1 (the parents) and 2 (their offspring), have survived over the course of the study. For convenience we will refer to these generations as G1 and G2, respectively.

In addition to reinterviews with G2 in 1997, self-administered data were obtained from G2’s offspring aged 15 and older, i.e., Generation 3 (G3). A total of 769 out of a possible 1,435 respondents returned their questionnaires, for a response rate of 54%. Pairing these respondents with their parents yielded a new set of parent-child pairs based on G2 and G3. Two important features distinguish these pairs from those based on the first two generations. First, in contrast to G2, but similar to G1, the third generation has a variable age range, with a mean of 23 and a standard deviation of 4.4. As described in more detail below, the age variation proves helpful for certain analytical purposes. It follows that G3, unlike G2, represents only a lineage cohort rather than a high school senior cohort. A second distinguishing feature is that whereas all of the earlier cases involved parents paired with a single child, some of the new cases include parents paired with two or more of their children. Overall, 32% of the new cases were based on parents paired with one child, 42% with two, 17% with three, and 4% with four.

For the most part we use a core set of ten measures. Because of our longitudinal perspective, we are constrained by the availability of questions that were asked across all study waves. A thumbnail description of all of the measures follows. Many of these are standard measures found in the National Election Studies (NES) series. Detailed descriptions of the others are contained in the appendix.

**Partisanship**—Intergenerational transmission of partisanship has been a staple of scholars in the field of political socialization as well as electoral behavior and political parties. One of the indicators used here is the standard 7-point party identification measure running from Strong Democrat to Strong Republican. The second indicator, presidential vote choice, is based on the partisan direction of the vote cast in the election(s) most proximate to the survey date.

**Political issues**—A hallmark of the era in which the class of 1965 came of age was an emphasis on the doctrines of civil rights and civil liberties as stressed especially by the civil rights, free speech, and antiwar movements. Popular depictions of generation gaps evolved out of such movements. One indicator in this attitudinal domain consists of the respondents’ racial attitudes, formed from their relative rating of blacks and whites on the 0–100° feeling thermometer and their opinions on whether the government should ensure the racial integration of schools. For civil liberties one measure taps opinions on whether school prayer should be allowed. A second is and a two-item index that assesses the individual’s tolerance of non-conformity based on whether communists should be allowed to hold local office and whether speeches against churches should be allowed. The sole indicator of traditional issues is the relative evaluations of big business and labor, as determined by placement on the feeling thermometer.

**Political trust**—Of all the measures employed in the project, this one has undergone the most drastic change at the aggregate level, the relatively high scores once accorded the federal government having plummeted over time. To build a political trust index we used the standard five items also found in the NES instruments.

**Political engagement**—Although we have extensive participation histories for each generation, no 1965 entry for G2 members exists inasmuch as they were just finishing high school at the time. Consequently, we rely on two measures that are available throughout. One is the conventional self-report of political interest—of how often the individual thinks about what’s going on in government—“most of the time, some of the time, only now and then, or hardly at all.” A second indicator consists of a political knowledge index based on the number of correct answers to five factual questions about historical and contemporary figures or institutions—term for U.S. Senators, number of Supreme Court justices, partisanship of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Marshall Tito’s home country, and location of WW II concentration camps for Jews.

**Religious orientations**—Fundamental manifestations of family-influenced socialization involve religious

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2Panel attrition from each generation and the absence of an initial parent interview account for the difference between the 935 four-wave panel members and the 636 parent-child pairs. The unadjusted retention rate from the original 1556 pairs is 41%. 58% of the 636 parents are mothers and 42% are fathers.

3This feature raises the issue of whether the data should be weighted by number of children. We report the unweighted results, which turn out to be very similar to the weighted results.

4Additional political issue questions were added to the survey after 1965 and are available for the G2-G3 analyses. We summarize the results for these additional measures when appropriate. The full set of analyses is available in the online appendix at http://journalofpolitics.org.
identification, beliefs, and behavior (e.g., Glass, Bengston, and Dunham 1986). In order to see if the processes characterizing the results in the political realm are restricted or more generalizable, we employ a two-item index of religiosity, combining frequency of church attendance and belief in the inerrancy of the Bible. While nominally tapping religiosity, these two indicators also have strong political manifestations (e.g., Miller and Shanks 1996, chaps. 9–10).

**Parent-Child Correspondence across Generations**

We posited earlier that rates of political reproduction within the family observed in the parent-child pairs originating in the mid 1960s may have been attenuated due to the dramatic historical circumstances surrounding the coming of age of the younger generation (G2). By contrast, the period during which the third generation (G3) came of age, roughly the mid-1980s to the mid 1990s, was relatively calm, bracketed by President Ronald Reagan’s second term and Bill Clinton’s first term. To the degree that disruptive socio-political events work to undermine parent-child political similarity, pair correspondence would be expected to be higher for our second set of pairs (G2-G3). However, a counterargument can be marshaled. Since the earlier era, familial structures have altered considerably, with a rise in divorce rates, blended families, and single parent households. Based on the social learning principles of sustained cue giving and reinforcement, these changes in family structure would arguably result in lower pair correspondence. Then, too, a variety of marked innovations have occurred in communications media, most notably that of the Internet. These innovations may have worked to reduce the primacy of the family as a source of political socialization.

Even if we do not observe wholesale differences across periods in the extent of parent-child transmission, differences on specific attributes may appear. One strong possibility concerns the issues that were salient in the respective periods. Issues involving race and civil rights dominated politics in the mid-1960s much more so than in the 1990s, whereas partisan controversies involving religion and morality were much more prominent in the latter period than the former. Because issues in the national spotlight are also likely to be salient within the home, we may find period differences in transmission that reflect the shifting political agenda. Another possibility concerns the parents’ role in shaping their children’s partisan attachments. Some scholars have suggested that parental influence has declined in recent years as ideological differences between the parties have become increasingly clear (e.g., Abramowitz and Saunders 1998; Carmines, McIver, and Stimson 1987).

In comparing the two sets of pairs we need to take into account a wrinkle occasioned by the survey design. Recall that G3 ranges in age and was older on average in 1997 than was G2 in 1965, which complicates comparisons between the two sets of pairs. To compensate for that, and to make a virtue out of variability, we distinguish two subsets of the G2-G3 pairs, those including children 16–20 years of age and those 24–28. The former have a mean age of 18, which equals that for G2 in 1965, and the latter a mean age of 26, which equals G2 as of 1973. As the headings in Table 1 make clearer, this enables a comparison between two sets of dyads, distinguished by whether the offspring were in their late teens or in their midtwenties. The G1-G2 pairs form an authentic panel whereas the G2-G3 pairs form a pseudo-panel.

To assess pair correspondence, we regressed the child’s score on the 10 core measures on the parent’s score as of the same year. All of the measures were scaled to run from 0 to 1. The unstandardized regression coefficients from these analyses, presented in Table 1, show how well the child’s score tends to corresponds to the parent’s score; a coefficient of 0 would indicate no correspondence and a coefficient of 1 would indicate perfect correspondence.

As Table 1 reveals, pair correspondence varies considerably across the measures. Our interest lies more in the comparison across generations, but it is worth noting that the highest concordance in both sets of pairs tends to be on objects that are more affect-laden and long-lived. Accordingly, measures involving partisanship, religion, and race lead the way. Perhaps the most inexplicable low relationship is that for political interest, especially when contrasted to the strong association evident on political knowledge.

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5Specifically, we estimated a three-level random-effects model with pairs nested within families and within schools using restricted maximum likelihood estimation (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). With the data were pooled across generations, the child’s response was regressed on a dummy variable indicating the generational pairing (G1-G2 vs. G2-G3), the parent’s response, and an interaction between the generational dummy and the parent’s response. Only the coefficient representing the relationship between the parent’s and the child’s response is shown. See the online appendix for a discussion of why multilevel models were employed.
and where we might expect higher consonance on the basis of family socioeconomic status alone.\(^6\)

Table 1 enables a comparison of the two sets of generational pairs, the first one involving offspring in their late teens (columns 1 and 2). Not too surprisingly, the more recent pairs resemble the original ones in terms of what kinds of political attributes are most likely to be matched. Partisan attitudes and attitudes with a strong affective or moral component (e.g., racial and school prayer attitudes) are most likely to be passed on from parent to child, as are religious orientations. More surprisingly, in terms of hypotheses based on the declining solidity of the family, correspondence in the fresh pairs essentially equals or surpasses that found in the original pairs. The conclusion about intergenerational similarity in parent-child transmission is reinforced by a comparison of the dyads when the offspring were in their midtwenties (columns 3 and 4). Only one of the differences between the two sets of pairs reaches statistical significance (business vs. labor). To the extent that differences do occur, the more recent pairs tend to be more congruent than the older ones.

While a general pattern of similarity rather than difference characterizes transmission across generations, the few items on which differences do appear merit attention. There is little sign that parents are less important in shaping their offspring’s partisan attachments in recent years, but there is evidence supporting the expectation that changing political contexts across generations can affect transmission levels. Consider the two political attributes having the greatest inter-generational discontinuity in transmission in Table 1: attitudes concerning race (greater for G1-G2, \(p = .07\)) and evaluation of business versus labor (greater for G2-G3, \(p < .05\)). The diminished correspondence on attitudes concerning race for G2-G3 relative to G1-G2 makes perfect sense given the changing nature of the political environment across the period (cf. Sears and Funk 1999). Racial issues, while not absent from the 1990s political agenda, had lost the center-stage they held in the 1960s.\(^7\)

Table 1: Contemporaneous Parent-Child Correspondence. Comparing First and Second Generations with Second and Third Generations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Youth in Late Teens</th>
<th>Youth in Mid-20s</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1st and 2nd</td>
<td>2nd and 3rd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Generations</td>
<td>Generations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Identification</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Vote Choice</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td>.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial Attitude</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>.20(^g)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opinion on School Prayer</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business vs. Labor</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Trust</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Knowledge</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in Politics</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.62(^**)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: In all but one case, entries were obtained from three-level random-effects analyses, with pairs nested within families and families nested within high schools, estimated using REML (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). The exception was Political Knowledge, where data were not available for G3; there, a two-level model (G1-G2 pairs within schools) was estimated using GLS and the Swamy-Arora variance components estimator. Cell entries are the estimated effect (b) of the parent’s response on the child’s response, with each variable scaled 0–1. Base Ns were 839 for the younger pairs and 925 for the older pairs, though the actual Ns in each analysis depended upon the extent of missing data. All coefficients are statistically greater than 0, at \(p < .05\) or better, except those for political trust in columns 2, 3, and 4. Asterisks indicate whether the difference in the coefficients across generations is statistically significant, based on the t-test for an interaction between the generational pairing (G1-G2 vs. G2-G3) and the parental attribute. \#\(p < .10\), *\(p < .05\), **\(p < .01\) two-tailed.

\(^6\)Because measurement unreliability will decrease the apparent level of parent-child disagreement (Dalton 1980), it can confound comparisons of transmission rates across measures. In order to diminish this confound, we tried to enhance and equalize the reliability of our indicators by building multi-item indices when possible. Nevertheless, the results of analyses that correct for measurement unreliability sustain the conclusions we draw in this section about the attributes most successfully transmitted from parent to child. See the online appendix.

\(^7\)Detailed analysis also shows that the transmission difference across generations is primarily limited to attitudes toward school integration, an issue that by the 1990s had lost salience. Attitudes about government assistance to blacks, by contrast, were at least as successfully transmitted in the later generation as in the earlier one.
Conversely, the higher correspondence on evaluations of business versus labor reflects the greater significance of this dimension for politics in the 1980s and 1990s than for politics in the 1960s, as revealed by over-time analyses of data based on national samples (Stoker and Jennings 2008). Note also that the young G2-G3 pairs display more consonance on religiosity than do the young G1-G2 pairs (p < .01).

A more detailed and extensive analysis of the transmission of religious orientations across the two generations shows that this is because religious non-involvement and secular beliefs are more faithfully transmitted in the more recent generation than in the older one. In any event, the political selves that parents convey to their children appear to reflect the salient political issues of the time.

Not surprisingly, contemporaneous correspondence tends to diminish over time in both sets of pairs. Columns 1 and 3 provide comparisons of the G1-G2 panel pairs as they “aged.” Attributes displaying more than a modicum of parent-child agreement in 1965, aside from political knowledge, underwent a decline by 1973. Those declines accord full well with theories (Erikson 1968; Mannheim [1928] 1972) and findings (e.g., Jennings 1989) about labileness during young adulthood. Such labileness should result in lowered parent-child agreement. Although based on a pseudo-panel, the G2-G3 data provide evidence of this as well (columns 2 and 4).

Data for the more recent pairs on the 10 additional measures not available in 1965 also bear on the replicability of family transmission patterns across the generations (online appendix Table A1). As with Table 1, congruence is highest on general orientations such as political ideology, though it is also very substantial on issues with a strong moral component such as gay rights, abortion, women’s rights, and environmental concerns. Indeed, the strongest relationship across all 20 measures evaluated for G2-G3 occurred on the issue of abortion—.70. As expected, similarity on more abstract and less affect-laden topics tends to drop off and to be lower for the pairs involving offspring in their midtwenties than for the pairs involving youth in their late teens.

On balance, the patterns of political reproduction do not differ appreciably across the generations. In each generation, parents were most successful in passing along their general partisan orientations to their children. Indeed, parents were as successful in doing so as they were in transmitting their level of religiosity. They were modestly to markedly less successful on other political attributes. Still, on salient issues with a strong moral and/or affective component the transmission rates were quite high, sometimes approaching or even exceeding the rates found for general partisan orientations. In terms of the political views that they acquired from their parents, then, the 1965 high school graduates do not appear as sui generis. Their own children, socialized in a strikingly different social and political era, were about as likely as they were to follow in their parents’ political, and religious, footsteps. These results indicate that while the content of what is passed on form parent to child is contingent on the socio-political nature of the times, the magnitude of the transmission is relatively impervious to those forces.

### Family Circumstances Enhancing Parent-Child Concordance

Both theory and prior research suggest that family circumstances will influence the extent to which transmission is successful. In this section we evaluate two propositions derived from social learning theory about the circumstances under which transmission will be enhanced (Bandura 1969, 1986). Each focuses on the nature of the cues parents provide and builds on one of social learning theory’s fundamental insights: that the success of observational learning depends on “the frequency, duration, rate, saliency, multiplicity, and complexity of modeling cues” (Bandura 1969, 222). The first proposition is that the transmission of political beliefs and attitudes from parents to children will, in general, be higher in more politicized family environments. Varying levels of politicization would be rough markers of the frequency and duration of cue giving on political issues in general. Political engagement on the part of the parents should generate more opportunities for signal giving, and hence, encourage more attention and learning on the part of the child. Similarly, low levels of parent politicization should leave the child either bereft or relatively open to influence from other socializing agents which, in turn, should discourage political consonance between parent and child.

A second proposition also derives from social learning theory’s interest in the nature of modeling cues. In addition to the general salience of politics within the home, the consistency of parental cue

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8This result would be undercut if two highly politicized parents disagreed with each other. However, both assortative mating and mutual socialization processes mean that parents are much more likely to agree than disagree with each other (Stoker and Jennings 2005).
giving for any given sociopolitical attribute should increase the level of parent-to-child transmission rates (Bandura 1977, chap. 2). As public opinion research has shown, while most citizens tend to form reasonably durable views about the political parties, presidential candidates, and issues involving morality, religion, and race relations, individual differences in attitude strength and stability across issues are prevalent (e.g., Alwin, Cohen, and Newcomb 1991; Converse and Markus 1979; Sears 1983; Sears and Valentino 1997). Correspondingly, the consistency and, hence, clarity of cue giving should vary across individuals and political topics. Therefore, we expect observational learning, and hence transmission, to be most successful when the parents’ political views are crystallized, stable, and communicated via consistent cues over long stretches of time.

To test the first proposition regarding the effects of family politicization, we built an index that combines information from the parents about their level of political engagement and information from the youth about the frequency of political discussion within their families (see appendix). To address the expectation regarding saliency and consistency of cue giving we constructed an index of the parent’s response stability. For the G1-G2 analysis, parent responses from the 1982, 1973, and (when available) the 1965 waves were used to build an index, for each variable, indicating response stability across the period. Perfectly stable parents anchored one end of the index while parents with large fluctuations from wave to wave anchored the other. Although this measure relies on data gathered well after the child left the parent’s home, we use it as an indicator of the consistency of signals while the child was being socialized. Our assumption is that the more stable the attitude from 1965 to 1982, the stronger the messages provided to the child in the 1950s and 1960s. We follow the same general procedure for the G2-G3 analysis, but here we gauge stability across the 1973–97 period for the Gen 2 parents, as they aged from 26 to 50 and reared the children that make up Gen 3.

We estimated the effects of each moderating variable simultaneously. Specifically, for each set of pairs, we estimated two-level (pairs within schools) random effects models that treated the youth’s response as dependent and included five independent variables: the parent’s response, family politicization (FP), and the product-interaction between the two, parent stability (PS), and the product interaction between parent stability and the parent’s response:

\[
Y_{thi} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Parent} + \beta_2 \text{FP} + \beta_3 \text{Parent} \times \text{FP} + \beta_4 \text{PS} + \beta_5 \text{Parent} \times \text{PS} + \epsilon
\]

Entries shown in the table are derived from these results. The first and second columns show the predicted effect of the parent’s response on the youth’s response when family politicization is set to low (.1) and high (.9) values, respectively, holding parent stability to its mean level. The third and fourth columns show the predicted effect of the parent’s response on the youth’s response when parent stability is set to low (.1) and high (.9) values, setting family politicization to its mean level. The results presented in Table 2 treat the G1-G2 pairs and Table 3 provides comparable results for G2-G3.

Turning first to the results based on politicization, we see rather limited effects on parent-child correspondence for generations 1 and 2 (Table 2, columns 1–2). Congruence typically increases under highly politicized environments, but only in the case of party identification, vote choice, political trust, and religiosity are these differences in the expected direction and statistically significant. Parent-child correspondence is actually diminished by higher family politicization on three measures, though not to a statistically significant extent. Further analysis shows that this pattern of lowered similarity is particularly strong, and statistically significant, with respect to attitudes about school integration, which is one component of the racial attitudes index. Limited correspondence on this issue arises because the youth gave more support to school integration than did their parents, especially if their family life was highly politicized. This finding most likely reflects the greater sensitivity of children in more politicized homes to the powerful period forces being exerted by the civil rights movement in the 1960s.

The results for the pairs from Generations 2 and 3 suggest a more substantial role for family politicization (Table 3, columns 1–2). Again, strong effects appear for party identification and vote choice. In these cases, transmission rates are spectacularly higher among the most politicized pairs. At the same time, the effects of family politicization also emerge for two of the issue-oriented measures in Table 3, school prayer and evaluations of business versus labor, and come close to attaining statistical significance for the third—racial attitudes. Moreover, effects of family politicization are evident on each of the ten supplemental variables analyzed for G2-G3 (Table A2, online). This group includes political ideology, as well as specific political attitudes regarding
gay rights, abortion, the women’s movement, environmentalists, the military, Vietnam, government job assistance, moral traditionalism, and limited government. Overall, then, families marked by parent political engagement and frequent political interchanges are families fostering the transmission of political attitudes and identities from parent to child.

Still, in many respects the differences in levels of parental stability produce the most striking effects (Tables 2–3, last two columns). As a general rule, when the parent’s attitudes are unstable, transmission is weak or nonexistent. But when they are clear and consistently cued, transmission rates are high, often dramatically so. Among pairs characterized by high

Table 2 Early Parent-Child Correspondence By Family Politicization and Parent’s Stability. First and Second Generations (1965)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family Politicization</th>
<th>Parent’s Stability</th>
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<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
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<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
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<tr>
<td>Party Identification</td>
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<td>Interest in Politics</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>.30</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note: Results are based on a two-level random effects analysis, treating families as nested within schools, estimated using GLS with the Swamy-Arora variance components estimator. Each analysis (save that for Political Interest) included five independent variables, all scored 0–1: (1) the parent’s score on the row variable, (2) Family Politicization (FP), (3) Parent Stability (PS), (4) the interaction between FP and the parent’s row variable score, and (5) the interaction between PS and the parent’s row variable score: Youth = β₀ + β₁Parent + β₂FP + β₃Parent*FP + β₄PS + β₅Parent*PS + ε. Entries shown in the table are derived from these results. The first and second columns show the predicted effect of the parent’s response on the youth’s response when Family Politicization is set to .1 (low) and .9 (high), respectively, holding PS to its mean level. The third and forth columns show the predicted effect of the parent’s response on the youth’s response when Parent Stability is set to .1 (low) and .9 (high), setting FP to its mean level. The Political Interest analysis excluded FP and the Parent Political Interest*FP interaction term (since Political Interest and FP are strongly related, both theoretically and empirically). Asterisks indicate the statistical significance of the relevant interaction coefficients. All coefficients are significantly greater than 0, at p < .05 or better, except those with absolute values of .12 or less. #p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, one-tailed.

Table 3 Early Parent-Child Correspondence By Family Politicization and Parent’s Stability. Second and Third Generations (1997)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family Politicization</th>
<th>Parent’s Stability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Identification</td>
<td>.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Vote Choice</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial Attitude</td>
<td>.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opinion on School Prayer</td>
<td>.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation of Business vs. Labor</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance</td>
<td>.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Trust</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Knowledge</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in Politics</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>.37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: See note to Table 3 for details concerning this analysis.
levels of parental stability, correspondence levels regarding specific issues often approach the magnitude found for party identification and vote choice. Even when the differences in correspondence are not statistically significant, they typically are in the right direction and sizable in magnitude, with t-statistics approaching statistically significant levels.

Parental stability also influences correspondence in a number of cases where family politicization does not, including attitudes about race and tolerance for both sets of pairs, and views on school prayer and business versus labor for G1-G2. This pattern presumably reflects the importance of clear and consistent parental messages on political matters not ordinarily the subject of political conversation in the family. Whereas high levels of parental political engagement and family political discussion encourage parent-child consonance regarding traditional political objects such as the political parties and presidential candidates, or in attitudes on issues of heightened significance to the political controversies of the times, its effects are not always felt on more peripheral matters. In such cases, what is critical to parent-child transmission is whether the parent holds clear and consistent views. The results regarding politicization and racial attitudes for the G1-G2 pairs (Table 2) provide the most critical exception to this claim. Parental stability boosts transmission rates but family politicization does not because youths from politicized homes, especially conservative ones, were far more attuned to changing national tides ushered in by the civil rights movement.

Analyzing the subset of cases where data were available from both mother and father provides additional strong support for the proposition that the consistency of cue giving promotes reproductive fidelity. Parental couples were arrayed according to their degree of agreement on the measures discussed above. In all instances, across both sets of intergenerational families, the apparent impact of a parent’s view on the child’s view is diminished, sometimes by striking margins, if that view is challenged rather than reinforced by the spouse’s view. As with stability of parental attitudes, this finding accords with expectations based on social learning processes.9

In sum, it is clear that family politicization and parental consistency are complementary, with each usually elevating the likelihood that children will adopt the political orientations of the parents. Successful transmission occurs less often when the family environment is apolitical and the parents have less consistent political (and religious) attributes; but similarity across generations is the norm when the home environment is politicized and when parents provide consistent signals about where they stand. These results demonstrate the explicitly political parental features under which the transmission model is likely to flourish and also show that the abetting conditions transcend distinctly different political eras. Both points provide strong support for a social learning perspective as applied to political socialization.

### Parent-Child Transmission: A Multivariate Assessment

Although the foregoing results are persuasive from a social learning perspective, they probably overstate the extent to which children come to resemble their parents via the social learning and social influence processes integral to the transmission model. One reason is that parental opinions may reflect other parental and/or family attributes, such as socioeconomic status, that could also be driving the development of the child’s political views. Another is that parental opinions will be related to the views of others in the child’s environment, including peers, who may be influential. Finally, the bivariate model neglects youth attributes that may be influential and yet confounded with parental views. In this section we develop and estimate multivariate models to take these considerations into account.

### Parent and Child Attributes

Children may resemble their parents via status inheritance and a shared social milieu, independently of transmission processes (e.g., Bengtson, Biblarz, and Roberts 2002; Dalton 1982). Children growing up in poor households, for example, may be drawn to the Democrats via their reputation as the party serving the poor and working class, regardless of their parents’ point of view. To capture such dynamics, in the multivariate analysis we add measures of family income and parent education as well as dummy variables distinguishing fathers from working mothers.

---

9 For these analyses we created a dataset of mother-father-child triads from the 1965 study (G1-G2, n = 430) and a second dataset of mother-father-child triads from the 1997 study (G2-G3, n = 539). At random, we designated one partner from each mother-father pair to serve as the “parent” and the other to serve as the “spouse” and then estimated a model that examined how well the child resembles the parent under varying circumstances of parent-spouse agreement. Further details and results are available upon request.
and non-working mothers, a dummy variable indicating the parent’s marital status, and a measure of the parent’s use of newspapers and magazines to obtain political information.

The multivariate analysis also includes youth attributes that may be shaping their political orientations and be confounded with parental views. These attributes are the child’s sex and race and three variables representing exposure to potential political influences outside the home: enrollment in civics class, level of organizational involvement, and the frequency of church attendance.

Local Political Climates

As recently and forcefully demonstrated by Campbell (2006) and Gimpel, Lay, and Schuknecht (2003) youth may be influenced by the political tendencies prevalent among their peers or in their local communities as well as by those of their parents. Illustratively, because liberal parents will tend to be more prevalent than conservative parents in liberal places, and vice versa, an analysis that fails to take into account local political climates will overstate the case for parental influence. Our multivariate analysis incorporates aggregate indicators of the political climates within the schools that the G2 youth respondents attended in 1965, using data from the 1965 Seniors Cohort Study (ICPSR study #7575), which includes mass-administered questionnaire data from the entire senior class in 77 of the 97 sample schools (N = 20,647).\(^\text{10}\)

The contextual variables are Party Identification: the percent identifying as Republican minus the percent identifying as Democrat; Vote Preference: the percent preferring LBJ in 1964; Racial Attitude: the percent identifying “prejudice and discrimination against minority groups” as something that they were “least proud of as an American;” Political Tolerance: average score on tolerance index using same indicators as with G2; Political Trust: average score on trust index using same indicators as with G2; Political Interest: average response to political interest question also used with G2. As expected, correlations between these school climate variables and the corresponding parental attitude measures were positive, in the .22–.34 range. We also built school-level indicators of Religiosity: the percent attending church “almost every week” and Socioeconomic Status: a six-item index taking into account information about parental education and occupation as well as the students’ anticipated education and occupation.

For all dependent variables but three the multivariate analysis includes the corresponding school-level political climate variable, as described above. The exceptions include evaluations of business vs. labor and political knowledge, for which there are no relevant school-level measure. As a proxy for the third exception, school prayer, we include school-level religiosity. Each analysis also includes the school-level SES indicator as well as dummy variables for region. Because the variation across schools that these contextual indicators gauge will mirror variation across the communities in which the schools are embedded, any estimated effects of high school climate may be due to influences operating in the local environment outside the school as well as those operating within it. The estimates are also vulnerable to selection bias confounds, but since we only include these variables in order to provide a stronger test of the transmission model and are not trying to draw substantive conclusions about contextual effects, we set aside the thorny issue of selection bias here.

Results

We proceed in two stages, beginning with the basic bivariate model that includes only the parent attribute as a predictor (column 1 in Table 4). We then add the parent, child, and contextual control variables. This strategy helps reveal how much of the initial estimate of parental influence remains after taking into account these alternative determinants of youth attributes (shown in column 2). Table 4 also displays the results for four of the variables most associated with socialization outcomes and usually seen as major rivals to the transmission model: parent education, family income, the school climate variable, and school-level SES.

As shown in Table 4, estimates of parent-child concordance are almost identical across the bivariate and multivariate models in five of the 10 cases—both where transmission levels are high (party identification, vote choice, and religiosity) and where they are low but reliable (evaluations of business vs. labor and political trust). This is so despite the fact that youth opinions also show strong associations with the contextual variables indexing the political and religious climates of their schools. Parental education and income also prove influential in a number of instances.
The multivariate analysis reveals transmission levels that are substantially lower than those evident in the bivariate analysis on three measures—racial attitudes, opinions on school prayer, and political knowledge. In each case, the coefficient on the parental attribute is diminished by about one-third but remains highly statistically significant. Contextual variables are at play with respect to racial attitudes and school prayer. In the former case, the primary confound is the local political climate, which is strongly associated with youth attitudes. Pair similarity on political knowledge is party driven by the higher knowledge levels attained among youth with highly educated parents.

In the two remaining cases, the low transmission levels evident in bivariate analysis disappear with the application of multivariate controls. Youth tolerance levels are better explained by parent education than by parent attitudes. By contrast, youth levels of political interest cannot be predicted on the basis of parent attributes, whether parent political interest or parent SES. This case is also unusual in showing no evidence of an influential local climate. The strongest predictor of the adolescents’ political interest levels is how involved they are in clubs and organizations, both inside and outside of school (not shown).

All in all, these findings converge with previous work demonstrating that bivariate transmission findings tend to be preserved even when family social milieu is taken into account (Dalton 1982; Glass, Bengston, and Dunham 1986; Jennings 1984; Tedin 1974; U.S. Department of Education 1999, 45–56). It follows that socialization models built only on demographic and structural features of the family will necessarily be incomplete. Not that children are typically subject to parental heavy-handed tuition. Rather, in the course of their development, children will be exposed to a variety of everyday cues and reinforcements from their parents that nudge them in the parental direction, net of a variety of other socialization vectors.

### The Long-Term Consequences of Family Transmission

In the preceding sections we have demonstrated the trail of parental influence in the customary way, as indexed by the association between parental and offspring attitudes. Now we shift the focus, somewhat, to ask how early socialization experiences affect the offspring as they wend their way through life. Are patterns of adult political development influenced by the early acquisition of parental views? If children are at least partly the product of their parents’ role as political socializers, then the degree of continuity among the socializees should represent the residue of parental influence over time.

### Table 4 A Multivariate Test of the Transmission Model. First and Second Generations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable: (Youth Attributes)</th>
<th>Bivariate</th>
<th>Multivariate Results on Selected Variables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Parent Attribute</td>
<td>Parent Attribute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Identification (n = 473)</td>
<td>.55**</td>
<td>.51**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote Choice (n = 395)</td>
<td>.55**</td>
<td>.54**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial Attitude (n = 487)</td>
<td>.31**</td>
<td>.21**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Prayer (n = 406)</td>
<td>.32**</td>
<td>.21**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business vs. Labor (n = 485)</td>
<td>.14**</td>
<td>.13**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Tolerance (n = 469)</td>
<td>.12**</td>
<td>.05</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political Trust (n = 439)</td>
<td>.14**</td>
<td>.13**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Knowledge (n = 475)</td>
<td>.42**</td>
<td>.31**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Interest (n = 474)</td>
<td>.10**</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity (n = 488)</td>
<td>.43**</td>
<td>.39**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Entries were obtained from two-level random-effects analyses, with pairs nested within high schools, estimated using GLS with the Swamy-Arora variance components estimator. Cell entries are the estimated effect (b) of the column variable on the child’s response on the row variable, with each variable scaled 0–1. Other predictors included in the multivariate analysis besides those shown in the table are dummy variables for region, parent marital status, sex of the parent, working status of the mother, parent media exposure, and child’s race, sex, organizational involvement, church attendance, and exposure to civics courses. #p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, one-tailed.
child begins the journey through adulthood imbued with parental political attributes. Offspring who most resemble their parents initially should, according to this argument, exhibit more over-time persistence than those less like their parents. If no differences in persistence emerge, any argument about the importance of the early political socialization within the family would be seriously undermined. Those who derive their early political views from their parents would be indistinguishable from those whose early political views lack this parental grounding.

The design of the project makes possible such a test of parental influence. We have the initial parent-child agreement patterns as of 1965, which establish a baseline. Because of the four waves of observations on G2, we have three panel periods for purposes of calculating rates of individual-level stability. Thus, we can evaluate youth continuity from 1965 to 1973 (age 18–26), from 1973 to 1982 (age 26–35), and from 1982 to 1997 (age 35–50), comparing those who initially adopted their parent’s view with those who did not. To estimate the degree of initial parent-child similarity we cross-tabulated parent and child scores on each of the individual measures to be examined and divided them according to their level of correspondence (see appendix for the details). To gauge over-time correspondence, we calculated Pearson continuity correlations.\(^{11}\) The analysis is based on all 4-wave youth respondents for whom parent data were available in 1965 (N = 887).

Table 5 contains the results. Regardless of agreement level, stability tended to increase, often quite substantially, from the first panel period to the second, and then to change modestly from the second to the third. This pattern reflects the crystallization process as individuals move through young adulthood. Of more immediate relevance are the comparisons between the high and low correspondence groups. The results are a bit mixed, but two features stand out.

First, stability differences are most pronounced during the initial panel period, 1965–73. Adolescents who were initially most like their parents were more stable during this period, though only decidedly so in seven out of the 10 cases.\(^{12}\) The significance of this pattern derives from the fact that the eight years covered by the early panel represent a time of enormous change and challenge to young adults, including new endeavors, personal relationships, residential locations, and “adult-level” contact with the political world. Those young adults entering the time frame more securely attached to the political “apron strings” of their parents were more likely to withstand the novelties they were to encounter. Those less anchored in that way proved to be far more vulnerable, and thus more apt to change.

Second, the differences between the groups diminish and even sometimes reverse direction during the second and third panel periods. This development is almost completely a function of the much larger gains in stability among those starting out with lower levels of agreement with their parents. Apparently, the added years of political experience give this subgroup an additional basis for the strengthening and hardening of their political views. Of course, those in higher agreement with their parents also accumulated more political experience, but this increment came on top of a base already laid down by their more sustained pre-adult socialization as well as the higher levels of stability that they had already achieved between 1965 and 1973.

As a result, a different pattern of political development emerges across the groups according to the degree of initial parent/child correspondence. For those who exit childhood without having embraced their parents’ views, the early years of adulthood are an especially critical period of political development. As they make the transition to adulthood, they tend to significantly revise their adolescent points of view. By contrast, those who leave childhood bearing the views of their parents show much more continuity across their late-teen to early-adult years. Though still adapting and growing over this period, they more often retain the views they inherited from their parents and articulated as adolescents.

\(^{11}\)The findings in Table 5 (and Table 6, which also presents Pearson Rs) are very similar to those found when using OLS regression coefficients to gauge continuity.

\(^{12}\)To evaluate the statistical significance of the difference between the continuity correlations across the low correspondence/high correspondence groups we used the nonparametric bootstrap procedure described by Davison and Hinkley (1997, especially 31–44, 204–14). We iterated the resampling procedure 10,000 times for each pair of coefficients, and drew the p-values reported in Tables 5 and 6 from bootstrap-adjusted one-sided confidence intervals. The parametric alternative, the Fisher r-to-z transformation, requires (and is sensitive to violations of) bivariate normality (Cohen and Cohen 1983). Still, the bootstrap significance levels were very similar to those we obtained using the Fisher technique.
Table 6 provides another way of looking at the long-term consequences of early socialization. Here, we examine over-time continuity in the two groups across the full 1965–97 period. Recall that as of 1997 the "children" were now 50 years old, and some 32 years beyond the initial recording of parent-child similarity. To what extent does the 50-year-old adult look like the 18-year-old adolescent? We gauge this over-time correspondence in both relative and absolute terms. Relative correspondence is indexed by a Pearson continuity correlation, calculated across the 1965–97 period. Absolute correspondence is indexed by the percentage of those taking the same, or a very similar, position in 1965 and 1997 (see appendix).

The pattern of findings in Table 6 reinforces what Table 5 demonstrated. Early acquisition of parental attributes has lifelong consequences. Relative continuity, or the extent to which one’s position in 1997 can be predicted by one’s position in 1965, is especially enhanced for basic partisan orientations, opinions toward school prayer, levels of political knowledge, and religiosity. Furthermore, on all but two items absolute continuity is significantly heightened among those who in 1965 had acquired their parents’ views. Illustratively, 64% of the "well-socialized" group retained their preadult party identification at age 50, compared with 55% of their "poorly socialized" counterparts. In this and most of the other cases found in Table 9, individuals bearing the trace of parental influence in 1965 showed higher levels of continuity well into middle age. This longitudinal evidence demonstrates the powerful, enduring effects of successful family transmission.

Conclusion

Our conclusions stem from an analysis of one set of parent-child pairs containing a youth cohort often dubbed the Protest Generation, and a second set containing the so-called Generation X. Notwithstanding the dramatic differences in family composition and life style, as well as the political environment characterizing their early socialization, the reproduction of
By uncovering parental attributes that affect parent-child transmission we demonstrated a fundamental, oft-neglected fact that is relevant to current public discourse concerning the political character of upcoming cohorts: parents can have an enormous degree of influence on the political learning that takes place in pre-adulthood. If parents are politically engaged and frequently discuss politics with the child, transmission rates rise substantially, particularly on topics of general political significance and salience. Regular political events such as campaigns and elections provide socialization opportunities for parents (Valentino and Sears 1998), as do more episodic events. Many parents obviously opt out of these opportunities, in part due to their own low levels of politicization.

Political reproduction across the generations occurs even more frequently when parental attitudes are reasonably consistent across time and between parents. On virtually all political (and religious) topics, transmission rates rise when salience and conviction are present. As a consequence, families will differ in what political commodities are being passed on. Most children may come to resemble their parents in one or another respect. But only if parents hold consistent attitudes on topics spanning the political agenda will children reproduce their parents’ political character to a much broader extent. Selective political reproduction becomes, therefore, a likely outcome.

Obvious challenges to the social learning explanation for parent-child concordance rest in other family characteristics and the local sociopolitical context. For the most part, the transmission model proved to be remarkably robust against such challenges. At the same time, it is clear that other factors are sometimes at work, including parental education and income. What is more unusual is our demonstration of the indirect role played by parents in terms of situating the child in a given local sociopolitical environment, indexed here by the opinion climate and socio-economic status of the local high school. The independent effect of these two measures on several of our political measures provides a strong example of parental influence operating outside the transmission model.

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14 For very similar results based on a range of mainly nonpolitical variables see Bengston, Biblarz, and Roberts 2002, chap. 6).
The legacy of parental influence also operates in a less obvious way. If children’s political development is initiated by their parents, this should matter to how they develop subsequently. It does. Children who acquire political predispositions early in life from their parents are more stable in their early adulthood than are those who “leave home without it.” Their predispositions, formed early, do persist. They carry that parental legacy forward, never fully losing the initial correspondence despite forces working to change them along the way. By contrast, those whose socialization in childhood is weak show much more instability well into their adult years. They exhibit a delayed pattern of political development, one where crystallized positions are slow to develop, one more susceptible to influences outside the childhood home.

Our results also speak to a new development in the study of political socialization. Social learning and status inheritance explanations for parent-child transmission have been challenged in recent years by studies of monozygotic and dizygotic twins, arguing that parent-child similarity on some political attitudes has a heavy genetic component (e.g., Alford, Funk, and Hibbing 2005, Martin et al. 1986). Although reservations have been raised regarding some of the assumptions guiding this path-breaking research (e.g., Beckwith and Morris 2008; Charney 2008), there is no blinking the findings themselves. In light of this challenge, testing expectations derived from social learning theory—as done here with measures of family politicization, consistency of parental cue giving, and persistence of early-acquired parental attitudes—assumes even more importance. Our affirmative findings in those respects are clearly compatible with a social mechanisms explanation. Nevertheless, it is possible that genetic mechanisms are doing at least some of the work. It remains for additional research to reconcile and perhaps integrate these two approaches to understanding parent-child concordance.

One substantive area included in our analysis has particular relevance for students of electoral behavior and political parties. An early and abiding focus found in studies of political socialization has been that of partisan orientations, which play a central role in affecting electoral outcomes and organizing issue stances. The formation of these orientations thus assumes importance. Spanning three generations and over three decades, our results demonstrate the continuing centrality of partisanship as an outcome of familial socialization. Children adopt parental partisan orientations more so than any other political characteristics. They tend to identify with the same party and to vote in a comparable fashion. The high levels of concordance found for partisan orientations compare favorably with those for levels of religiosity, as indexed by frequency of church attendance and beliefs about the inerrancy of the Bible. Parents are expected to exert a powerful influence on the religious practices and beliefs of their children. That they exert a similar level of influence on the child’s partisan predispositions, which are presumably less central to overall character development, is both striking and significant, not least because it helps sustain a commitment to partisanship and a competitive two-party system.

Our overall results raise two particularly intriguing questions. We have traced the lagged effects of parental views that the youth were exposed to as adolescents, which provides a sense of how the initial parental legacy persists. Parents, however, do not stop being parents when the child reaches age 18, and may continue to influence the child in subsequent years. And the offspring, no longer “children,” may be exerting influences on the parent in turn. This dynamic remains to be analyzed carefully. Parents may be influencing their adult children and vice versa. Alternatively, attributes that the two share, such as socioeconomic status or partisan identification, may be shaping in parallel fashion the development of attitudes on new, or newly salient, issues. This scenario suggests a more complex model of parental influence, one wherein parents inculcate basic orientations, which then influence responses to subsequent political stimuli.

A second intriguing question involves the interaction between politicization within the family and the political climate while the child is still at home. We noted in passing that adolescents emerging from highly politicized homes in 1965 less often adopted the parental position on school integration than did adolescents from apolitical homes. This finding reflects the susceptibility of the politicized children to broader political forces at work, in that they were more likely to reject the anti-integration position commonly expressed by their parents than were children from less politicized homes. On the one hand, then, having a politicized family environment typically encourages the child to learn from the parent and to adopt the parent’s views. On the other hand, it also leaves the child more attuned to outside political influences. In periods of upheaval like those of the mid-1960s, or in general when the political environment contains forces antithetical to parental inclinations, this politicization may work against within-family congruence. Understanding how political engagement plays out in such cases, and tracing its
implications for aggregate intergenerational change, constitutes another important challenge for future research.

Appendix

Additional Information on Question Wording and Index Construction

All variables reported on here and in the text were coded to range from 0 to 1.

**Presidential Vote Choice.** For 1965: vote (G1) or preference (G2) in the 1964 presidential election. For 1997: an index combining vote for President in 1992 and in 1996 (with one missing value allowed).

**Racial Attitude.** An index averaging two component variables (with one missing value allowed). For G1-G2: (1) attitude toward school integration and (2) the relative evaluation of whites vs. blacks. For G2-G3: (1) attitude toward school integration and (2) attitude toward government assistance for blacks. School Integration: A 3-point scale coded 0 for “Washington should see to it that white and black children go to the same schools” .5 for “depends” and 1 for [Washington should] “stay out of the area as it is none of its business.” Evaluation of Whites-Blacks: Difference between the feeling thermometer score for whites and the score for blacks. Aid to Blacks: A 7-point scale, with endpoints: “the government in Washington should make every possible effort to improve the social and economic position of blacks and other minority groups” versus “the government should not make any special effort to help minorities because they should help themselves.”

**Opinion on School Prayer.** A 3-point scale coded 1: “schools should be allowed to start each day with a prayer,” .5 “depends” or 0 “religion does not belong in the schools.”

**Evaluations of Business versus Labor.** Difference in evaluations of “Big Business” and “Labor Unions” on a 0–100° feeling thermometer scale.

**Tolerance.** An index combining responses to two agree/disagree questions: (1) “If someone wanted to make a speech in this community against churches and religion, that person should be allowed to speak.” (2) “If a Communist were legally elected to some public office around here, people should allow that person to take office.”

**Family Politicization** (Tables 3–4). An index formed by averaging two components. (1) Parent’s political engagement, the number of “yes” responses to six questions about political participation: working for a party, issue, or candidate; attempting to persuade others during election campaigns; attending meetings, rallies, or dinners; displaying campaign buttons or stickers; giving money for campaigns; and voting in the most recent presidential election. (2) Frequency of political discussion in the family, as reported by the child. In 1965: Do you talk about public affairs and politics with members of your family?” (If Yes) “How often would you say that is—several times a week, a few times a month, or once or twice a year?” In 1997: “How often do you and your parents talk about any kind of public affairs and politics, that is, anything having to do with local, state, national, or international affairs?” Response options were “very often,” “pretty often,” “not very often,” and “never.”

**Parent’s Stability** (Tables 3–4). Each variable was created in four steps. First, we computed the absolute differences of responses between adjacent waves of the survey. Second, we calculated the average of those absolute difference scores, across 65–73 and 73–82 for G1, and across 73–82 and 82–97 for G2. Third, we recoded extremely unstable individuals (defined as having z-scores > 3.0 on the index formed from steps 1 and 2), if any, to the next lowest score found on the variable. This was done to reduce the leverage of outliers on the analysis. Finally, we scaled the variable to range from 0 (completely stable) to 1 (maximal instability, caveat from step 3 aside).

**Control Variables used in Multivariate Analysis** (Tables 4, 7). School climate variables: See description in the text. School-level SES: An index using (1) % of high school seniors going on to college (school-reported), (2) mother’s education and (3) father’s education (% at least some college minus % less than high school), (4) average father’s occupation Duncan decile code, (5) % of seniors anticipating going on to college after high school, (6) average anticipated occupation Duncan decile code. Each variable was first standardized before averaging the index components. Family Income: Respondents in each income category were first assigned an income in dollars equal to the category midpoint. The 1965, 1973, and 1982 scores were transformed into 1997 dollars by adjusting for inflation using the average CPI figures obtained from ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiiat.txt, and then rescaled to range from 0 (no income) to 1 (highest income in 1997 dollars).

**Parent-Child Correspondence** (Tables 5–6). A dichotomous variable, distinguishing pairs by the
similarity of parent and child responses. In the “high correspondence” group, the parent and child had the same response on the variable in question or, in two cases, an absolute difference of .05 or less (attitude toward blacks and business versus labor). For PID, the high correspondence group included those who articulated the same party preference or leaning.

1965–1996 Absolute Continuity (Table 6). The 1965 and 1997 variables were first recoded, if necessary, to create a meaningful number of distinct categories. Then, people were categorized as stable or unstable on the basis of whether they gave the same or different responses in 1965 and 1997. The business versus labor variable was first recoded into a 3-point scale (collapsing 0–.44, .45–.55, and .56–1), as was the scale tapping attitudes toward blacks and the index of religiosity. The original political trust and political knowledge scales were also collapsed into three point scales by combining the two low, the two middle, and the two high categories. On party identification, people were categorized as giving the same response if they expressed the same partisan preference or leaning, or lack thereof, in 1965 and 1997.

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Women to the Left? Gender Differences in Political Beliefs and Policy Preferences

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Gender and Elections in Canada
Women to the Left? Gender Differences in Political Beliefs and Policy Preferences

The 1993 federal election witnessed the emergence of a significant gender gap in support for the new party of the right: women were much less likely than men to vote Reform, a trend that continued in the 1997 federal election.\(^1\) Although the Reform Party subsequently reconstituted itself as the Alliance Party and sought to reshape its image, the gender gap in support persisted in the 2000 federal election.\(^2\) Meanwhile, in the 1997 election, a gender gap also opened up on the left and it, too, appeared again in the 2000 election. In both 1997 and 2000, women were more likely than men to opt for the NDP, the traditional party of the left.\(^3\) In this chapter, we examine whether these gender gaps in vote choice are paralleled by differences between women and men in their basic political beliefs and policy preferences.

The gender gap literature suggests that there should be significant differences in women’s and men’s opinions on questions relating to social welfare policy, free enterprise, and questions relating to the use of force. There is a growing body of evidence showing that Canadian women are more sceptical about the workings of the free enterprise system and more supportive of the welfare state than Canadian men (Terry 1984; Kopinak 1987; Wearing and Wearing 1991; Everitt 1998b). And women attach a higher priority to social welfare issues than men do (Gidengil 1995; Everitt 2002). There is also compelling evidence that women are more reluctant than men to resort to the use of force (Terry 1984; Everitt 1998b). By contrast, gender gaps on other issues have typically been weak or inconsistent. This is true of feminist beliefs and women’s issues more generally (Terry 1984; O’Neill 1995; Everitt 1998a, 1998b)\(^4\), as well as issues relating to questions of morality and social mores in general.

As Pippa Norris (forthcoming) has recently reminded us, though, context matters to both the size and direction of gender gaps. The 2000 federal election provides a novel context for examining gender gaps in a variety of domains. With a federal budget surplus, the question was no longer where cuts should be made to social programmes, but where new monies should be allocated. And with the unemployment rate now clearly on the decline, jobs were no longer the central issue that they had been in the two preceding elections (see Nadeau et al. 2000; Nevitte et al. 2000). Meanwhile, with the Liberals campaigning to portray the Alliance as a party of social conservatives out of step with mainstream Canadian society and with the religious beliefs of the Alliance leader a matter of media scrutiny, issues relating to traditional moral standards and lifestyle choices assumed a new electoral importance.

We use data from the 2000 Canadian Election Study to examine gender differences in this changed electoral context.\(^5\) We begin with a review of the reasons that have been advanced for the existence of gender gaps in political beliefs and policy preferences. Then we see how much difference gender makes to opinions in each of the relevant attitudinal domains. For each domain, we create a scale in order to have a summary indication of the overall gender gap in that domain.\(^6\) In order to get a better sense of the importance (or not) of these gaps, we compare the male-female differences with the differences across Canada’s most consequential electoral cleavage, namely, region. These composite measures also provide us with a parsimonious way of evaluating the various explanations that have been advanced for the gender gap phenomenon.
Explaining the Gender Gap Phenomenon

Structural and Situational Explanations

A recent study of the gender gap phenomenon in the United States was aptly titled, “The Complexities of the Gender Gap” (Howell and Day, 2000). As the authors observe, “No single explanation has been generally accepted, possibly because they all contribute a piece of the puzzle” (p. 859). The various explanations fall into two broad types: the first type focuses on structural and situational factors that differentiate the life experiences of women and men, while the second type focuses on socio-psychological differences that reflect gender role socialization in childhood.

One of the most prominent structural arguments links the gender gap to women’s greater reliance on the state. According to the welfare state dismantlement hypothesis (Erie and Rein 1988; see also Piven 1984; Deitch 1988), women should be more supportive than men of the government’s role in providing a “social safety net” and more opposed to policies that threaten it. The “feminization of poverty” means that women are more likely than men to need the social safety net provided by the welfare state. At the same time, women are more likely than men to rely on the public sector for their employment. Whether as recipients of social welfare or as service providers, it was women who bore a disproportionate share of the costs of retrenchment in the 1990s (Bashevkin 2000). The implication of this argument is that sex differences in support for the welfare state would disappear if the material circumstances and employment patterns of women and men were more similar. While the welfare state dismantlement thesis emphasizes women’s distinctive experiences, the welfare backlash thesis switches the conceptual focus to men (Greenberg 2000). This variant of the argument points to changes in the nature of welfare provision and in particular to the fact that men have ceased to be the primary beneficiaries of social welfare programmes (Mettler 1998). The result, it concludes, is an erosion of support for the welfare state among men.

A second structural argument looks beyond women’s role as state workers to the effects of gendered patterns of employment more generally (see De Vaus and McAllister 1989; Manza and Brooks 1998; Togeby 1994). Entry into the paid workforce is assumed to have a radicalizing effect on women as they find themselves disproportionately concentrated in low-paying jobs or confined to “pink-collar ghettos”. These distinctive experiences in the work place may foster a feminist consciousness on the part of working women and a questioning of traditional roles (Klein 1984; Manza and Brooks 1998).7 Participation in the paid work force may also enhance support for collective provision since working women have more need of state services to assist them with childcare and other parental responsibilities (Manza and Brooks 1998).

Where these arguments emphasize differences in women’s and men’s material interests, other accounts of the gender gap focus on interests that are explicitly linked to gender per se. These accounts revolve around the mobilizing effects of feminism. One variant focuses on the impact on women of feminist issues like abortion, discrimination in the workplace, the lack of female representation in politics, and patriarchal structures in society at large. A second variant switches the conceptual focus to men, pointing to a possible anti-feminist backlash on the part of those men who resent the transformations in gender roles wrought by second-wave feminism (Kitschelt 1995). There are also suggestions that this anti-feminist backlash may be part of a
larger resentment toward changes in cultural values and practices that have challenged the status of the white male. This resentment is seen as manifesting itself in a renewed emphasis on traditional social values and respect for authority (Ignazi 1992).

These structural explanations all revolve in some way around the notion of gender differences in self-interest, whether material or not. The gender roles interpretation, by contrast, focuses on women’s traditional role as care givers. As Jeff Manza and Clem Brooks (1998) observe, this type of explanation emphasizes the effects of adult socialization as women experience motherhood and parenting. Sara Ruddick (1989) has been the leading exponent of the argument that these experiences foster a form “maternal thinking” that promotes a more compassionate view of those in need. While this is generally seen as encouraging a liberal stance on issues relating to the use of force and social welfare, the argument has also been made that having children can be a conservative influence in women’s lives, especially on questions of morality (De Vaus and McAllister 1989).  

Socio-Psychological Explanations

All of the explanations discussed so far point to objective differences between women and men. A second type of explanation centres instead on socio-psychological differences that transcend these differences in objective circumstances. This type of explanation focuses on differences in women’s and men’s values and priorities that have their origin in childhood socialization. Its theoretical underpinnings derive from Gilligan’s (1982) work on gender differences in moral reasoning. Her counterposing of the female and male “voices” suggests that women will be less individualistic than men (see also Phelan 1990). In her study, men’s moral reasoning tended to emphasize competing rights and give primacy to the individual, while women’s moral reasoning put the emphasis on conflicting responsibilities and treated relationships as primary. And where the moral imperative for men took the form of an “injunction to respect the rights of others and thus to protect from interference the rights to life and self-fulfilment,” the moral imperative for women appeared as an “injunction to care, a responsibility to discern and alleviate the ‘real and recognizable trouble’ of this world” (Gilligan 1982, 100). Applied to the realm of politics, this contrast in moral reasoning suggests that women will be more sceptical of market solutions than men and will be more willing to endorse government intervention on behalf of the needy. The implication is that these sex differences will persist regardless of material circumstances, sector of employment, or adult roles.

Gilligan’s work also provides a possible explanation for sex differences in opinions on issues relating to law and order and the use of force. While the men in her study tended to favour a hierarchical conception of society and to value separation, the women were more likely to conceive of society as a web of connection and to value inclusiveness. These contrasting conceptions translated into differing views about human aggression and how it should be dealt with. As Gilligan (1982, 43) argues, “If aggression is tied, as women perceive, to the fracture of human connection, then the activities of care...are the activities that make the social world safe, by avoiding isolation and preventing aggression...In this light, aggression appears no longer as an unruly impulse that must be contained but rather as a signal of a fracture of connection, the sign of a failure of relationship.” The masculine model of hierarchy and subordination, by contrast, find its counterpart in a greater readiness to resort to the use of coercion and control, or what Pratto and her colleagues (1997) have termed a “social dominance orientation.”
The gender gap in support for the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement in the 1988 federal election provides some support for Gilligan’s model (Gidengil 1995). Not only were women less receptive than men to market-based arguments, but these arguments had less effect on their opinions about the agreement. For women, the agreement’s implications for Canada’s social programmes were the more important concern. Tellingly, these differences in women’s values and priorities could not be explained in terms of their material disadvantage. O’Neill (2002) has recently taken Gilligan’s model a step further to argue that there is “a women’s political culture,” albeit one that is overlapping with men’s. As she readily acknowledges, it is difficult to provide direct evidence of the existence of gendered subcultures, but to the extent that gender differences in opinion cannot be explained by differences in other social background characteristics, the idea gains plausibility. Indeed, social-psychological interpretations of the gender gap imply that the differences between women and men will cut across other social divisions (see Elshtain 1984; Sears and Huddy 1990).

This should not be taken to mean, of course, that women constitute some sort of monolithic opinion bloc. On the contrary, we need to take account of the many differences among women–and men–themselves. To this end, we examine a number of possible sources of opinion heterogeneity among women, including education, marital status, age cohort, and religiosity.

**Free Enterprise, the Welfare State and Health Policy**

We begin with views about the role of the state versus the market, our focus gradually narrowing from general questions about the workings of the free enterprise system to specific questions about health policy. As we noted above, previous studies of the gender gap phenomenon have consistently found that women are less sanguine than men about the virtues of free enterprise, more supportive of social welfare programmes, and less open to market solutions. It turns out these differences are not just a function of hard economic times and cutbacks in the welfare state.

Even in the changed context of the 2000 federal election, women remained consistently more sceptical than men about the workings of the free enterprise system, though the degree of scepticism depends very much on which aspect of those workings is under discussion (see Figure 1). Women are especially sceptical of the notion that “When businesses make a lot of money, everyone benefits, including the poor”. On the other hand, they tend to believe that “People who don’t get ahead should blame themselves, not the system” and that “If people really want work, they can find a job”. Clearly, though, they are less persuaded than men that individual effort will be rewarded. Similarly, women are more reluctant than men to rely on market solutions. Indeed, only a minority of women believe that “The government should leave it entirely to the private sector to create jobs”. And they are less ready than men to agree that, “Unemployed people should move to regions where there are jobs”. Still, on the latter question, a majority of women do seem to prefer the market solution. When these items are combined to form a scale (that runs from 0 to 1), we can clearly see that women (.52) are more ambivalent than men (.59) about the free enterprise system. The difference is fairly modest but it is statistically significant (p<.01) and it exceeds the differences among income groups and across Canada’s regional divides.
Similar sex differences appear when we look at views about the welfare system (see Figure 2). First, improving social welfare programmes was clearly a much more important election issue for women than for men. Of the eight issues that respondents were asked to rate, improving social welfare programmes (along with improving health care, see below) revealed the largest difference in the priorities of women and men. Second, women were more likely than men to believe that more should be done to reduce the gap between the rich and the poor in Canada, and they were also more likely to think that “The government should see to it that everyone has a decent standard of living” rather than “leave people to get ahead on their own”. And finally, women were more likely than men to reject the notion that the welfare state undercuts the work ethic by making “people less willing to look after themselves”.

However, the fact that a majority of women did not reject this argument should temper any characterization of women’s support for the welfare state. Only a minority of women rated improving social welfare programmes as being “very important”. And despite their concern with income disparities and despite endorsing the government’s role in providing a social safety net, both men and women are reluctant to support an increase in welfare spending. By the same token, views about welfare spending provide little support for the notion that resentment of the welfare state is a distinctively masculine orientation. With close to half thinking that the federal government should continue to spend “about the same as now”, any anti-welfare backlash is very much a minority phenomenon among women and men alike.10

The difference between women and men on social welfare questions should certainly not be overstated. When we combined the items to form a 0 to 1 scale (with ‘1’ representing the highest level of support for the welfare system), the difference between women (.64) and men (.58) was statistically significant (p<.01) but it was clearly much smaller than the gap that separated the lowest (.68) and the highest (.55) income groups. And with mean scores ranging from a low of .54 in the West to a high of .70 in Quebec, the regional differences also outstripped the sex differences.11 The fact remains, though, that the advent of an era of federal budget surpluses has not eliminated the differences between women and men in their views about social welfare.

Opinions about health care provide further evidence that women are more inclined than men to favour state provision. Improving health care was the single most important issue in the 2000 federal election for women and men alike. But the issue was more salient for women than for men (see Figure 3). It is easy to understand why such importance was attached to the issue and also why it was even more important for women: two-thirds of men and fully three-quarters of women believed that the quality of health care had deteriorated over the previous five years. Not surprisingly, women and men largely agreed that this was an area where spending by the federal government should be increased. Interestingly, though, a substantial number of those who perceived the quality of health care to have worsened blamed the deterioration on poor management rather than lack of money. This was true of both women (40 percent) and men (36 percent).
Even though women were more likely to think that the quality of health care had deteriorated, they were more opposed than men to market solutions, such as allowing private hospitals in Canada or allowing doctors to charge a fee for office visits. When we combined these two items into a simple additive scale that ran from 0 (favour both private hospitals and user fees) to 1 (oppose both private hospitals and user fees), women received an average score of .67, compared with .57 for men (p<.01). Again, the difference between women and men is hardly huge, but it rivalled the difference between the lowest (.67) and the highest (.56) income groups and it exceeded the regional differences, at least outside Quebec.12

Whether we look at views about free enterprise, the welfare state, or health policy, a similar pattern of sex differences appears. Women are more ambivalent about the free enterprise system, more sympathetic to the welfare state, and more reluctant to turn to the market for solutions. But a key question remains unanswered: is this because women tend to be more reliant on the state or is it because women in general tend to be less individualistic than men, as Gilligan’s (1982) work suggests?

The welfare state dismantlement thesis implies that women will be less persuaded of the virtues of free enterprise than men because they are less likely to be among its beneficiaries. While the gap is narrower among women (.52) and men (.56) in the lowest income group (p<.10), women in the highest income group prove to be only slightly more pro-free enterprise (.54) than less affluent women.13 A similar pattern holds for views about the welfare state. If the welfare state dismantlement thesis explained the gender gap in support for the welfare state, we would expect the gap to disappear once we control for income differences. The gap between women (.69) and men (.67) does narrow in the lowest income group, but affluent women remain significantly (p<.01) more supportive of the welfare system (.61) than similarly affluent men (.52), and income clearly makes less of a difference to women’s opinions than it does to men’s. Differences in the material circumstances of women and men made even less difference to their views about health care. True, the gap between women (.70) and men (.64) was smaller in the lowest income category, but it still met conventional levels of statistical significance (p<.05), and the gap (p<.01) actually widened among the most affluent women (.63) and men (.51). In fact, high-income women were almost as committed to universal provision as low-income men. Clearly, something other than differences in material self-interest must be driving these gender gaps.

This conclusion is reinforced when we look at the effects of sector of employment. According to the welfare state dismantlement thesis, part of the explanation for these gender gaps in views about the role of the state versus the market lies in the fact that women are more likely than men to be employed in the public sector. Regardless of sex, public sector workers should be more committed to state provision and universality: once we take sector of employment into account, the gender gaps should disappear. It turns out, though, that the gender gaps persist, regardless of sector of employment. Whether they are employed in the public sector or in the private sector makes little difference to women’s and men’s opinions about the free enterprise system. A similar pattern holds for views about welfare. Men employed in the public...
sector are no more supportive of the welfare system than their counterparts in the private sector, and women employed in the public sector do not score significantly higher (.64) than women employed in the private sector (.61). And far from eliminating the gender gap in support for universal health care, the gap is actually wider among women (.72) and men (.60) in the public sector (p<.01).

Similarly, *gendered patterns of employment* more generally cannot explain these differences in the views of women and men. According to this argument, entry into the paid work force has a radicalizing effect on women by exposing them to gender inequalities and discrimination. However, labour force participation has little or no effect on women’s (or men’s) perceptions of the economic system, and women remain more supportive of universal health care whether they are in the paid workforce or not. As for views about welfare, support for the welfare system is if anything a little lower among women who are in paid employment (c.f. Everitt 2001), though they remain significantly (p<.01) more supportive (.62) than men who are employed (.55).

Having children is also said to have a radicalizing effect on women by pushing them in a more liberal direction, at least on questions having to do with collective provision and the role of the state. Togeby (1994) suggests that this effect will be most evident when there is only one child. This *gender roles* argument does not fare well, though. If anything, women with a single child are slightly more persuaded (.55) of the virtues of free enterprise. And far from having a radicalizing effect, women who have one child tend to be a little less positive in their views about welfare. Surprisingly, having children has no effect on women’s views on health policy. The effect is confined to men and it is consistent with Togeby’s argument that having one child has a radicalizing effect, whereas having more than one child has the opposite effect.

The fact that none of these structural and situational explanations can account for the gender gaps in views about the role of the state versus the market lends plausibility to sociopsychological interpretations that emphasize gender differences in fundamental values. To the extent that women are less individualistic than men, this cannot be explained in terms of differences in material interests or experiences in the workforce or the home. As we noted above, though, there are a variety of differences among women themselves that need to be taken into account.

First, the *women's autonomy* argument suggests that women require economic and psychological independence from men in order to express their distinctive values and priorities (Carroll 1988). To achieve psychological independence, women have to transcend traditional sex-role socialization. One of the most potent factors in encouraging such independence is higher education. Economic independence, meanwhile, is more likely to be achieved by women who are in paid employment and who are not married. As Carroll (1988) notes, “economic independence is highly, although not perfectly correlated with marital status”.

This argument implies that scepticism about the free enterprise system should be most apparent among women who are in paid employment, who are more highly educated, and who have either never married or are separated or divorced. The same should be true of support for the welfare system and public provision of health care. However, these expectations receive only
mixed and weak support. We have already seen that labour force participation does not have the expected effect. The same holds for marital status: the gender gaps are not confined to those who have never married but appear regardless of marital status. Women who have never married (.46) are a little more sceptical of the virtues of free enterprise, but married women remain significantly (p<.01) more sceptical (.54) than married men (.61). A similar pattern holds for views about welfare and health care. With one notable exception, education has little effect on women’s views on all of these questions. The exception is health care: as the level of education increases, the gender gap widens. The mean score for university-educated women is .70, compared with only .54 for their male counterparts (p<.01). Aside from this, though, there is little to suggest that the gender gaps are more likely to occur among women who enjoy sufficient autonomy to express their difference from men.

Norris (1999) meanwhile has pointed to the existence of a gender-generation gap that she attributes to the impact of the second-wave women’s movement on the cohorts of women who reached maturity in its wake. The effect of this feminist mobilization is to make younger women more liberal in their views than men and older women alike. In order to pursue this possibility, we compared opinions across four age cohorts that correspond to distinct phases in the evolution of the women’s movement: the pre-second wave cohort born before 1942; the second-wave cohort born between 1942 and 1957; the post-movement cohort, born between 1958 and 1972; and finally the third-wave cohort born after 1972 (see Everitt 2001).

However, this feminist catalyst argument fares little better than the women’s autonomy argument. Women who came of age during the rise of third-wave feminism are a little more sceptical of the virtues of free enterprise (.48) than women whose formative experiences predated the rise of the second-wave feminism (.56), but a parallel effect appears for men. On the other hand, there is no association between age and support for the welfare system: the gender gap cuts across age cohorts. And if exposure to the feminist movement has a radicalizing effect on women’s views about health care, that effect is modest and it is confined to women who came of age during the rise of third-wave feminism (.74). The gender gap persists, regardless of age cohort, and even in the pre-second wave cohort, women (.67) are significantly (p<.01) more opposed to market solutions than men (.58).

An Anti-Feminist Backlash?

So far, we have been treating feminist mobilization as a possible catalyst for the expression of women’s difference, but we also need to compare women’s and men’s orientations toward the feminist movement and indeed toward gender issues more generally. One possible explanation for the rightward tilt on the part of some men is a reaction against changes in gender roles over the past three decades that have challenged their traditional position of dominance within both the public and private spheres. Given the central role of the feminist movement in instigating this challenge, we should expect to find much more negative views about feminism among men.

If we focus simply on how much sympathy respondents express with feminism, we could immediately discount the notion of an anti-feminist backlash on the part of men. If anything, it is
women, not men, who are less likely to be sympathetic (see Figure 4). However, men do tend to have less positive perceptions of the feminist movement. They were less likely than women to think that the feminist movement “just tries to get equal treatment for women” and encourages women “to be independent and speak up for themselves”. Significantly, though, only a minority of men opted for the view that the feminist movement “puts men down” (27 percent) and encourages women “to be selfish and think only of themselves” (18 percent). And these views had less impact on men’s sympathy with feminism than on women’s: only 42 percent of men who said the movement puts men down and 50 percent of those who said it encourages women to be selfish were unsympathetic, compared with 63 percent and 68 percent, respectively, of women.

When the three items are combined into a pro-feminism scale, there is a statistically significant (p<.01), albeit modest, difference in the mean scores of women (.72) and men (.67) on a 0 to 1 scale. With average scores ranging from a low of .67 in both Ontario and the West to a high of .77 in Quebec (p<.01), where a person lives clearly has more of an effect on their views about feminism than whether they are a man or a woman. As the gender-generation gap thesis would lead us to expect, there is even less difference among women (.68) and men (.65) who came of age before the advent of the second-wave women’s movement. That said, the differences across age cohorts in support for feminism are surprisingly modest, even among women. It is only among women who were socialized during the rise of third-wave feminism that there is much of an increase in support for feminism (.78).

O’Neill (2001) argues that religiosity acts as a countervailing force to feminism in many women’s lives and this may well be one reason why the gender gap in support for feminism is so modest. Religion is typically a more salient factor for women than for men: Canadian women are more likely to state a religious affiliation than Canadian men and they are also more likely to say that religion is personally important to them. Religiosity does indeed help to explain why the gender gap is support for feminism is so modest. The gap disappears altogether among women (.64) and men (.64) for whom religion is very important, and there are significantly more women (36 percent) than men (26 percent) who say that religion is important in their lives. Tellingly, secularism is associated with a sizeable increase in support for feminism among women (.80) but not among men (.68).

The women’s autonomy argument would predict that support for feminism would also be higher among women who enjoy economic and psychological independence from men. However, labour force participation has virtually no impact on women’s (or men’s) support for feminism, and full-time homemakers in particular are no less supportive than women in general. Education, meanwhile, has only very modest effects, with support ranging from .69 among women who did not complete high school to .77 among university graduates (p<.05). The one dimension of the women’s autonomy argument that does make a difference is marital status, with support ranging from a low of .69 among women in traditional (that is, non-common law) marriages to .81 among those who have never married (p<.01). There are no indications that having children has a radicalizing effect on women.

The lack of effect for labour force participation may seem surprising given that women are more likely than men to believe that “discrimination makes it extremely difficult for women
to get jobs equal to their abilities” (see Figure 4). It turns out, though, that this belief is less prevalent among women (and men) who are in paid employment (53 percent) than among those who are not (63 percent). This poses something of a challenge to the notion that participation in the labour force radicalizes women by exposing them to gender inequalities.

As with views about feminism, opinions about gender-related issues do not lend much support to the notion of a backlash on the part of men. Women and men alike generally reject the suggestion that “If a company has to lay off some of its employees, the first workers to be laid off should be women whose husbands have jobs”. Only a small minority would countenance such blatant discrimination and they are as likely to be women (11 percent) as they are to be men (12 percent). And when it comes to conceptions of gender roles, women are actually a little less likely than men to reject the traditional notion that “society would be better off if more women stayed home with their children”.

On the other hand, women are more likely than men to say that more should be done for women and they are much more likely to agree that having more female MPs is the best way to protect women’s interests. That said, they do not necessarily see the lack of women in the House of Commons as a serious problem and they are only a little less reluctant than men to endorse the idea of requiring parties to nominate as many women as men candidates.

The questions on discrimination, doing more for women and having more women MPs were combined into a scale. The scale revealed a significant (p<.01) gap between women (.62) and men (.54) on attitudes toward gender-related issues. The gap may be modest but it rivals the differences (ranging from a low of .55 in the West to a high of .64 in Quebec) to be observed across Canada’s regions. There is little evidence, though, of any gender-generation gap. Attitudes on gender-related questions are even less affected by age cohort than was support for feminism. Whether socialized before the advent of second-wave feminism or during the rise of third-wave feminism, women on average hold very similar views on these questions. And if the gender gap narrows in the oldest cohort, it is because older men actually score a little higher than younger men. In contrast to support for feminism, religiosity has only very minor effects on views about gender-related issues.

There is even less support for the women’s autonomy argument. Labour force participation has little discernible impact on women’s views and now marital status, too, makes only a small difference (and it is women who are divorced or separated who have the highest mean score at .69). The impact of education is actually stronger among men, with scores ranging from a high of .61 for men who did not complete high school to a low of .50 for university graduates. Education has very little impact on women, and it is women who did not complete high school who score highest (.67). Finally, far from radicalizing women, if anything having children is associated with a slightly less pro-woman stance on these questions (.60 versus .64 for women with no children).

Moral Traditionalism

Whether we look at support for feminism or at views about gender-related issues more generally, the differences between women and men are too modest to support a charge of a
significant anti-feminist backlash on the part of men. However, this does not preclude the possibility of a more generalized cultural backlash against changes in values and lifestyles.

[Figure 5 about here]

There are certainly indications that men tend to be a little more conservative than women when it comes to issues of moral traditionalism, but the differences are nowhere near large enough to justify referring to a cultural backlash on the part of Canadian men (see Figure 5). The one issue on which women and men really differ is gay marriage. Only one third of the women interviewed were opposed to allowing gays and lesbians to get married, compared with almost half of the men. Among women, a clear majority (58 percent) came out in favour of allowing gay marriages. The other sex differences were much more modest. Women were even less likely than men to agree with the statement that, “Only people who are married should be having children” or to reject the notion that “We should be more tolerant of people who choose to live according to their own standards, even if they are very different from our own”. They were also a little less likely to agree that “Newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of our society” and that “This country would have many fewer problems if there were more emphasis on traditional family values”. It should be noted, though, that over two-thirds of women did agree with the latter proposition. And when it came to the notion that “The world is always changing and we should adapt our view of moral behaviour to these changes”, women were actually more likely to disagree than were men. Finally, to the extent that there was any difference at all on abortion, it was women who thought it should be more difficult for a woman to get an abortion.

Not surprisingly, then, when these items are combined into an additive scale, women (.47) score only marginally lower than men (.49) on moral traditionalism, a difference that barely reaches conventional levels of statistical significance (p<.05). The impact of gender on moral traditionalism pales beside that of other social background characteristics. Differences among regions, for example, range from a high of .52 in Atlantic Canada to a low of .41 in Quebec (p<.01).

Age has an even stronger effect than region, with average scores ranging from a low of .35 for the youngest cohort to .58 for the oldest cohort (p<.01). However, the pattern of age effects does not conform to the notion of a gender-generation gap. On the contrary, the effect of age is virtually the same for women and men.

O’Neill (2001) shows that religion has a conservative influence in many women’s lives (see also De Vaus and McAllister 1989; Mayer and Smith 1995), and serves to limit the size of the gender gaps on questions relating to civil liberties (like pornography, capital punishment, and the rights of gays and lesbians). If this argument applies to issues of traditional morality more generally, we would expect the gender gap to be wider among women and men who are more secular. Religiosity is indeed one of the most important correlates of moral traditionalism for women and men alike. Average scores on the moral traditionalism scale range from a low of .34 among respondents to whom religion is not important at all to a high of .60 among those to whom it is very important (p<.01). However, women’s greater religiosity does not explain the modest size of the gender gap on these questions as a whole. The gender gap is only slightly wider among women (.30) and men (.36) to whom religion is unimportant (p<.05).
A similar pattern holds for marital status. Women who are living in common law relationships clearly take more liberal positions on these questions (.37) than those who are living in traditional marriages (.50), but the same is true of their male counterparts (.38). Surprisingly, perhaps, having children makes no difference to women (or men), despite the assumption of some gender role theorists that parenthood increases concern on women’s part for moral standards in society.

There is some support, though, for the women’s autonomy argument. Education has more impact on women than on men. The more education women have, the less likely they are to be moral traditionalists. Average scores range from .57 among women who did not complete high school to only .40 among university graduates, compared with a range of .55 to .44 for men. And to the extent that labour force participation makes a difference, women (but not men) who are in paid employment do tend to take less traditional positions on questions of morality (.44) than women who are not part of the labour force (.51).

Crime and Punishment

As we noted above, Gilligan’s (1982) work suggests that women will be less likely than men to favour a punitive approach in dealing with crime. This turns out to be the case. The fact that women were even more concerned about crime than men were makes the differences in views about crime and punishment all the more interesting. Among women and men alike, crime ranked second only to health care in the number of times it was described as being a very important issue to the respondent. However, it was even more important to women than to men (see Figure 6). One reason may be that women were more likely to think that crime had increased over the previous five years. Even among those who thought that crime had gone down, though, women (66 percent) were more likely than men (56 percent) to describe it as a very important issue. Three quarters of women and almost as many men concurred that “We must crack down on crime even if that means people lose their rights”. Where women and men parted company was on the treatment of those who commit crimes. Women were less likely than men to advocate a punitive approach in dealing with young offenders. Men clearly opted for tougher sentences (53 percent) over rehabilitation (33 percent), but women were divided, with almost as many choosing rehabilitation (41 percent) as choosing the get-tough approach (43 percent). Similarly, women were much less likely than men to favour the death penalty. Indeed, more women opposed (43 percent) the death penalty than favoured it. Moreover, there seemed to be a good deal of ambivalence about the question: 20 percent of women responded that they did not know, compared with 14 percent of men.

[Figure 6 about here]

The division was even sharper when it came to gun control. Two-thirds of the women agreed that “only the military and police offices should be allowed to have guns”, compared with only half of the men. This finding is very much in line with prior research in Canada and elsewhere that has consistently found sizeable gender gaps on issues relating to the use of force (Smith 1984; Terry 1984; Everitt 1998b). Surprisingly, perhaps, this reluctance to resort to force even extends to peacekeeping. Women (53 percent) were much less ready than men (67 percent) to agree that, “Canada should participate in peacekeeping operations abroad even if it means
putting the lives of Canadian soldiers at risk”. As with the other issue of life and death, many women (13 percent) were unsure how to respond (compared with only 4 percent of men).

When we combined the two items dealing with offenders into a simple additive scale, running from 0 (rehabilitate young offenders and oppose the death penalty) to 1 (tougher sentences for young offenders and favour the death penalty), men (.58) clearly emerged on the get-tough side, while women (.49) were close to the midpoint (p<.01). Moreover, women’s views on dealing with offenders were little affected by the region of Canada in which they live. The same cannot be said of men, with mean scores ranging from a low of .50 in Quebec to a high of .64 in the West (p<.01).

According to the gender-generation gap argument, younger women should be more liberal than men and older women alike. This is very much the pattern that appeared for views about crime and punishment. The gender gap was widest among women (.41) and men (.56) in the youngest age cohort (p<.01). And while young women were clearly more opposed than older women to treating offenders harshly, young men were little different from their elders.

There is also some support for the women’s autonomy argument. The key idea here is that women require psychological and economic independence from men in order to express their “difference”. Two key indicators are education and marital status. As the argument would predict, the more formal schooling women had, the less likely they were to favour a get-tough approach to crime: mean scores range from a high of .54 for those who did not complete high school to a low of .37 for university graduates (p<.01). Meanwhile, education had little effect on men’s views, though men with a university education were less likely to embrace the get-tough approach (.49). It bears emphasis that the difference across educational levels among women easily exceeded the overall difference between women and men. Marital status also had the predicted effect: women in traditional marriages tended to take a tougher line on crime than did women who had never married. This said, the gender gap persisted, regardless of marital status. The other factor that is assumed to limit women’s autonomy is confinement to the domestic sphere, but participation in the paid work force had little effect on women’s (or men’s) opinions. Women who had children at home (.54) were a little less liberal than those who did not (.46) when it came to matters of crime and punishment, but the effect is not consistent enough to claim much support for the gender roles argument. A similar conclusion holds for the impact of religiosity.

Discussion

Despite the change in the economic context and the advent of budget surpluses, women clearly remain more sceptical of the virtues of free enterprise, more supportive of the welfare system, and more reluctant to endorse market solutions than men in the 2000 federal election. The fact that these gender gaps could not be explained in terms of differences in women’s and men’s material interests lends weight to the socio-psychological argument that women tend to be less individualistic than men. The gender gap in views about crime and punishment also provides support for a socio-psychological interpretation of the gender gap phenomenon.

In contrast to a number of earlier studies, we also find consistent evidence of gender gaps in opinions on both feminism and gender-related questions more generally. However, these gaps
do not extend to the broader domain of traditional social values, despite the fact that the 2000 election brought questions of traditional morality to the fore. There are signs that men tend to take slightly more conservative stances on these questions than women do, but with the notable exception of gay marriage, the gender gaps are small and/or inconsistent. And even on the issues that are explicitly gendered, the differences among women themselves exceed the differences between women and men, as do the regional differences. Religiosity, in particular, clearly served as a conservative influence when it came to views about feminism and questions of traditional morality.

Other sources of difference among women prove to be less important. Of the factors that might enhance women’s autonomy, education and marital status were the most consequential, but their effects were not uniform. There is little indication that participation in the paid workforce makes a significant difference to women’s views. Meanwhile, having children either had no effect or had contradictory effects.

While the socio-psychological approach generally fared better than the structural and situational explanations, the gaps we observed would seem too modest to support the notion of a distinctive “women’s political culture” (O’Neill, 2002). That does not mean, though, that they are inconsequential. The gender gaps on free enterprise, health policy, and crime and punishment all exceed the differences across Canada’s regional divides. And because gender is the “fault line of maximum potential cleavage” (Jennings 1988, 9), even small differences between women and men can have important implications for party fortunes. Finally, to the extent that younger women, but not younger men, are more left-wing than their elders in domains like health care, feminism, and crime and punishment, we can expect these gender gaps to increase through generational turnover. Gender, in short, is a source of cleavage than must be taken seriously in any analysis of Canadian politics.
Bibliography


Appendix: Question Wording

Note: the text in square brackets indicates in which wave of the survey the question was asked. The prefix ‘cps’ indicates the campaign telephone survey, ‘pes’ indicates the post-election telephone survey, and ‘mbs’ indicates the self-administered mail back survey.

Free Enterprise

For each statement below, please indicate if you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree:

When businesses make a lot of money, everyone benefits, including the poor [pesg16]
People who don’t get ahead should blame themselves, not the system [pesg15]
If people really want work, they can find a job [mbsa11]
The government should leave it entirely to the private sector to create jobs [cpsf6]
If people can’t find work in the region where they live, they should move to where there are jobs [cpsf20]

The Welfare State

To you personally, in this federal election, is improving social welfare programmes very important, somewhat important or not very important [cpsa2f]

How much should be done to reduce the gap between the rich and the poor in Canada: much more, somewhat more, about the same as now, somewhat less, or much less? [cpsc13]

Please circle the number that best reflects your opinion:

The government should [mbsb1]:

See to it that everyone has a decent standard of living
Leave people to get ahead on their own

For each statement below, please indicate if you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree:

The welfare state makes people less willing to look after themselves [mbsa4]
Should the federal government spend more, less, or about the same as now on welfare? [pesd1b]
**Health Policy**

To you personally, in this federal election, is improving health care very important, somewhat important or not very important [cpsa2e]

Has the quality of health care in Canada over the past five years got worse, got better, or stayed about the same? [cpsc6]

Should the federal government spend more, less, or about the same as now on health care? [pesd1d]

Would you favour or oppose having some private hospitals in Canada? [pesd7]

And would you favour or oppose letting doctors charge patients a [$10][$20] fee for each office visit? [pesd8a/b] note: the amount of the fee was randomly varied

**Feminism and Gender-Related Issues**

Are you very sympathetic towards feminism, quite sympathetic, not very sympathetic, or not sympathetic at all? [pesg20]

Please circle the number that best reflects your opinion:

The feminist movement encourages women [mbsb7]:

- To be independent and speak up for themselves
- To be selfish and think only of themselves

The feminist movement [mbsb2]:

- Just tries to get equal treatment for women
- Puts men down

For each statement below, please indicate if you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree:

- Discrimination makes it extremely difficult for women to get jobs equal to their abilities [mbsa5]

- If a company has to lay off some of its employees, the first workers to be laid off should be women whose husbands have jobs [mbsa3]

- The best way to protect women’s interests is to have more women in Parliament [mbsa15]

- Society would be better off if more women stayed home with their children [cpsf3]
How much should be done for women: much more, somewhat more, about the same as now, somewhat less, much less or haven’t you thought much about it? [cpsc10]

As you may know, there are many more men than women in the House of Commons. In your view, is this a very serious problem, quite a serious problem, not a very serious problem, or not a serious problem at all? [pesg7a]

Would you favour or oppose requiring the parties to have an equal number of male and female candidates? [pesg7b]

**Moral Traditionalism**

For each statement below, please indicate if you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree:

- Gays and lesbians should be allowed to get married [cpsf18]
- Only people who are legally married should be having children [mbse4]
- We should be more tolerant of people who choose to live according to their own standards, even if they are very different from our own [mbsa2]
- Newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of our society [mbsa7]
- This country would have many fewer problems if there were more emphasis on traditional family values [mbsa9]
- The world is always changing and we should adapt our view of moral behaviour to these changes [mbsa8]

And now a question on abortion: do you think it should be very easy for women to get an abortion, quite easy, quite difficult, or very difficult? [pesg8]

**Crime and Punishment**

To you personally, in this federal election, is fighting crime very important, somewhat important or not very important [cpsa2b]

Do you think that crime in Canada has gone up, gone down, or stayed about the same in the last few years? [cpsj50]

Which is the best way to deal with young offenders who commit violent crime: one, give them tougher sentences, or, two, spend more on rehabilitating them? [cpsj51]

Do you favour or oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of murder? [cpsc15]
For each statement below, please indicate if you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree:

We must crack down on crime, even if that means that criminals lose their rights [mbse5]

Only the police and the military should be allowed to have guns [cpsf19]
The authors are grateful to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for funding under its Major Collaborative Research Initiatives Programme. The authors would also like to thank Cameron Anderson for his research assistance.

1In 1993, 15 percent of women voted Reform, compared with 23 percent of men. In 1997, 18 percent of women voted Reform, compared with 26 percent of men.

2Alliance attracted the votes of 32 percent of men, but only 22 percent of women.

3In 1997, 13 percent of women voted NDP, compared with 8 percent of men. In 2000, 12 percent of women opted for the NDP, compared with 9 percent of men.

4Focusing on feminist consciousness, as opposed to feminist issues, O’Neill (2001) has recently found evidence of larger gender differences in this domain.

5Funding for the 2000 Canadian Election Study was provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, Elections Canada, and the Institute for Research in Public Policy. The field work was conducted by the Institute for Social Research at York University (outside Quebec) and Jolicoeur (in Quebec). The study consisted of a 30-minute campaign interview, a 30-minute post-election interview, and a self-administered mail back questionnaire. The response rate for the campaign survey was 59 percent. Of the 3,647 respondents interviewed during the campaign, 2,918 completed the post-election survey and 1,539 returned the mail back questionnaire. This chapter uses items from all three waves of the study. The demographic composition of the three waves is similar, except for the fact that the mail back has fewer respondents in the youngest age group. To the extent that any of the gender gaps are wider among young people, the overall size of those gaps may be underestimated.

6Each scale is a simple additive scale. The individual items were all re-scaled to run from 0 to 1 and then summed to form the scale. Dividing the total scores by the number of items yielded a scale that runs from 0 to 1. Wording for all questions used in this chapter can be found in the Appendix. Scalability was assessed using Cronbach’s Alpha. The coefficients ranged from .47 to .74. On the basis of his meta-analysis of the magnitude of alpha coefficients obtained in behavioural research, Peterson (1994) reports that the average alpha coefficient for scales measuring values and beliefs is .70. The average coefficient for the scales used in this chapter is .60. Scales with a small number of items typically yield lower coefficients.

7As they readily acknowledge, it is possible that the arrow runs both ways. In other words, it may also be the case that a growing feminist consciousness encourages women to enter the paid work force.

8Togeby (1994) found that the effects of parenthood on women vary depending on the number of children. In her study, having a single child was associated with more left-wing views, while subsequent children appeared to make women more conservative.
The pro-free enterprise scale has a reliability coefficient of Alpha = .51. Average scores range from .55 in both Atlantic Canada and Ontario to .58 in the West (p<.05) and from .54 in the lowest income tercile to .59 in the highest income tercile (p<.01).

Twenty-two percent of men favoured spending less on welfare, compared with 20 percent of women.

The pro-welfare scale has a coefficient of reliability of Alpha = .69. Both the income differences and the regional differences are significant at the p<.01 level.

The universal health care scale has a coefficient of reliability of Alpha = .47. The income differences are significant at the p<.01 level. Regional scores ranged from .60 in the West to .68 in Ontario (p<.01). Quebec was the outlier, with an average score of only .55.

The gap between women and men in the highest income tercile remains significant at the .01 level.

However, Everitt (1998a) found that feminist mobilization appears to have affected young men and young women alike, at least on questions relating to feminism and equality.

The figures for women are 15 percent and 11 percent, respectively.

The pro-feminism scale has a coefficient of reliability of Alpha = .66.

The gap is statistically significant at the p<.01 level.

If anything, women with one child are less supportive of feminism (.65).

The gender scale has a coefficient of reliability of Alpha = .58. The questions on the lack of women MPs and requiring parties to nominate equal numbers of women and men could not be included because they were only asked of a random half-sample. The inclusion of the stay home item would result in a much lower coefficient of reliability (Alpha = .45). The regional differences are significant at the p<.01 level.

The moral traditionalism scale has a coefficient of reliability of Alpha = .74.

The impact of marital status is significant at the p<.01 level for women and men alike.

The differences within and among these groups are all significant at the p<.01 level.

The crime and punishment scale has a coefficient of reliability of Alpha = .53.

Mean scores ranged from .60 for men who did not complete high school to .62 for those with some post-secondary education.

While the overall difference is statistically significant at the p<.01 level, the effect of children-rearing declines with the number of children. The average score for women with one child at
home is .56, compared with .49 for those with three or more children.

26 Mean scores range from .45 for women to whom religion is not at all important to .51 for those to whom it is very important.

27 It should be noted that O’Neill looks beyond survey-based studies of public opinion and cites evidence from in-depth interviews that women and men differ in their conceptions of politics and democratic citizenship.
Significance levels for female-male differences: *** p<.01   ** p<.05   * p<.10
Figure 2. The Welfare System

- Social welfare is a very important issue***
  - Women: 44%
  - Men: 31%

- Should do more to reduce gap between rich and poor***
  - Women: 78%
  - Men: 71%

- The government should see that everyone has a decent standard of living***
  - Women: 68%
  - Men: 61%

- The welfare state makes people less willing to look after themselves (disagree)***
  - Women: 38%
  - Men: 30%

- Increase welfare spending
  - Women: 32%
  - Men: 29%

Significance levels for female-male differences: *** p<.01   ** p<.05   * p<.10
Figure 3: Health Care

- Health care is a very important issue: 78% of women and 78% of men agree.
- Health care has got worse: 66% of women and 76% of men agree.
- Increase spending on health care: 85% of women and 89% of men agree.
- Oppose allowing private hospitals: 56% of women and 50% of men are opposed.
- Oppose allowing doctors to charge a fee: 70% of women and 60% of men are opposed.

Significance levels for female-male differences: *** p<.01   ** p<.05   * p<.10
Figure 4: Feminism and Gender-Related Issues

- Sympathetic to feminism***
  - Women: 60%
  - Men: 65%

- The feminist movement encourages women to be independent***
  - Women: 71%
  - Men: 80%

- The feminist movement just tries to get equal treatment for women***
  - Women: 53%
  - Men: 63%

- Discrimination makes it extremely difficult for women***
  - Women: 46%
  - Men: 57%

- Do not lay off women with employed husbands first
  - Women: 86%
  - Men: 86%

- Society would not be better off if more women stayed home***
  - Women: 50%
  - Men: 54%

- Should do more for women***
  - Women: 66%
  - Men: 66%

- Having more women MPs is best way to protect women's interests***
  - Women: 56%
  - Men: 56%

- Lack of women MPs is a serious problem***
  - Women: 36%
  - Men: 41%

- Favour requiring parties to nominate 50% women**
  - Women: 31%
  - Men: 37%

Significance Levels for female-male differences: *** p<.01   ** p<.05   * p<.10
Figure 5: Moral Traditionalism

Significance levels for female-male differences: *** p<.01   ** p<.05   * p<.10
Figure 6: Crime and Punishment

Crime is a very important issue***
- Women: 76%
- Men: 68%

Crime has gone up***
- Women: 55%
- Men: 43%

Crack down on crime***
- Women: 76%
- Men: 72%

Tougher sentences for young offenders***
- Women: 53%
- Men: 43%

Favour death penalty***
- Women: 49%
- Men: 36%

Support gun control***
- Women: 65%
- Men: 49%

Significance levels for female-male differences: *** p<.01   ** p<.05   * p<.10
Childhood Socialization and Political Attitudes: Evidence from a Natural Experiment

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Scholars have argued that childhood experiences strongly impact political attitudes, but we actually have little causal evidence since external factors that could influence preferences are correlated with the household environment. We utilize a younger sibling’s gender to isolate random variation in the childhood environment and thereby provide unique evidence of political socialization. Having sisters causes young men to be more likely to express conservative viewpoints with regards to gender roles and to identify as Republicans. We demonstrate these results in two panel surveys conducted decades apart: the Political Socialization Panel (PSP) and the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). We also use data collected during childhood to uncover evidence for a potential underlying mechanism: families with more female children are more likely to reinforce traditional gender roles. The results demonstrate that previously understudied childhood experiences can have important causal effects on political attitude formation.

How do childhood experiences affect the formation of political preferences? Although attitudes change somewhat over time, the development of political identity during childhood appears to profoundly influence future political decision making (e.g., Campbell et al. 1960; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002).1 Some of the most important evidence on the relationship between childhood experiences and later political attitudes comes from the groundbreaking survey research conducted by M. Kent Jennings and Richard Niemi. The numerous articles and books that emerged out of their longitudinal study of American youth generally explored how political attitudes are passed down from parent to child (e.g., Jennings and Niemi 1968, 1974; Tedin 1974, 1980). In the most recent analysis of the full four-wave panel, Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers (2009) find that intergenerational political influence persists 40 years later. In short, existing research has argued strongly for a crucial and enduring relationship between childhood experiences and political beliefs.

At the same time, a variety of potential explanations other than socialization can account for the similarity of political attitudes among members of the same household. For example, major events, people, or social forces outside of the household may simultaneously influence everyone in it, causing their attitudes to be similar. Further, recent research has suggested that some of the association between parent and child political attitudes can be attributed to genetics as opposed to environmental factors (e.g., Alford, Funk, and Hibbing 2005; Hatemi et al. 2009; Settle, Dawes, and Fowler 2009).2 To identify the causal impact that the childhood environment has on political attitudes requires a natural experiment that enables us to isolate a specific aspect of that environment.

In this article, we consider such a natural experiment by examining the effect of siblings on political

1An online appendix for this article is available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0022381613000996 containing supplemental analyses. Data and supporting materials necessary to reproduce the numerical results in the article will be made available at the IQSS Dataverse under the name of the article title within one month of publication.

2Scholars have also explored other instances of intrahousehold political influence. For instance, Stoker and Jennings (2005) observe that husbands and wives have similar attitudes, a relationship that could be explained by spouses influencing each other. However, these findings are also subject to endogeneity bias as mates may select each other based on existing political predispositions (Alford et al. 2011; Huber and Malhotra 2012).
attitudes. Our independent variable of interest is the share of an individual’s siblings who are sisters.\(^3\) Even assuming that child gender is randomly assigned, a major concern when analyzing the effect of sibling gender is endogenous fertility choice. Parents may choose stopping rules—whether to have additional children—that depend on the gender of the children they currently have so that an older sibling’s gender is not randomly assigned. For example, parents who have a preference for boys may continue to have children when they have daughters, but not when they have sons. Therefore, children with older brothers may tend to be part of different kinds of families than children who have older sisters.\(^4\) This means that the share of an individual's siblings who are sisters is endogenous since parents’ choices about whether to have additional children determine the overall share of female children. On the other hand, conditional on parents choosing to have an additional child, the gender of the next sibling is assigned at random.\(^5\) We can use this random variable to identify the effect of growing up with a greater proportion of sisters.

To estimate the effect of having sisters on political attitudes, we analyze data from the University of Michigan Political Socialization Panel (PSP) and the children of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) young-adult sample. In addition to having detailed information on a respondent’s siblings, each of these rich panel datasets offers unique advantages. The PSP has data on gender-role attitudes and partisanship collected over four waves—starting in 1965 and ending in 1997—enabling us to consider the effect of having sisters on political attitudes over a long stretch of time. In addition to making it possible to replicate the PSP results, the NLSY contains information on respondents’ childhood experiences. Although the NLSY only asked political attitude questions recently, it asked detailed questions in earlier surveys about household tasks performed during childhood, allowing us to explore a potential underlying mechanism. Both datasets also contain detailed parental information which we use to conduct randomization checks that confirm the validity of the natural experiment. More broadly, findings in political behavior often come from a single survey or experiment. Being able to demonstrate a particular effect in two independent datasets is uncommon and increases the plausibility of the results.

In both datasets, we find that having sisters rather than brothers makes young men—but not young women—more likely to express conservative positions on gender roles and to identify as Republicans. The consistency of the positive effects for men (and the null effects for women) across specifications and datasets is striking. In the PSP, compared to male respondents whose siblings were all brothers, we estimate that male respondents who grew up with only sisters are up to a full category more conservative on gender roles on a 7-point scale. In the NLSY, which was administered more than 30 years after the first wave of the PSP, the effect of having sisters on males’ gender-role attitudes is significant but smaller, suggesting that the effect may have been larger in a time of less progressive views on gender issues. The effects on partisanship are of similar size in the two datasets and statistically stronger in the NLSY due to its larger sample size.

Our analyses also suggest a potential mechanism. In the NLSY, detailed data collected from respondents during their childhood show that boys with sisters are substantially less likely to have performed female-stereotyped household tasks during childhood than boys with brothers. For girls, sibling gender has no effect on chore assignment. We also utilize the PSP data to show that men who grew up with sisters continue to perform fewer household chores even in middle age, suggesting the persistent effect of childhood experiences. As we describe in the following section, these effects of having sisters for males in particular is consistent with existing research on family interactions. The gender stereotyping of the childhood environment thus may help to explain the effects that sisters have on male political attitudes.

Our results provide two unique contributions to the literature on political socialization. The first contribution is methodological. Our findings provide quasi-experimental evidence that childhood experiences can play an important role in shaping people’s political preferences. Accordingly, our findings support a causal interpretation of earlier research. Second, our results provide evidence that socialization can happen in subtle and unexpected ways. The vast majority of the literature has argued that socialization causes children’s views to resemble their parents’ views. Our findings suggest that having sisters may influence men in such a way that

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\(^3\) Below, we sometimes use the more colloquial term “having sisters” to refer to our independent variable of interest.

\(^4\) Recently, Urbatsch (2011) examined the effect of sibling gender using the 1994 General Social Survey (GSS), but he looked at older sibling gender and therefore did not analyze the data as a natural experiment. Unlike the PSP and the NLSY, the GSS is not a longitudinal study and does not have detailed household-register data collected during respondents’ childhoods.

\(^5\) The gender of the younger sibling may affect some parents’ decisions about whether to have subsequent children, which would simply introduce heterogeneity and noise into the estimated treatment effects.
Gender Roles and Political Attitudes: Theory and Evidence

While most research on political socialization has focused on the effect that parents have on their children (however, see Tedin, Brady, and Vedlitz 1977), evidence from sociology and psychology indicates that siblings can often have just as big an impact (e.g., Smetana, Campione-Barr, and Metzger 2006). This effect can occur through direct interactions between siblings or indirectly through the parents. With respect to the latter mechanism, previous research has found that having sisters has an important impact on how children, particularly boys, are raised. For example, in assigning housework, daughters are more likely to be given tasks such as doing the dishes. As a result, boys are less likely to perform female-stereotyped tasks when they have sisters who get assigned those tasks (Gager, Cooney, and Call 1999; McHale et al. 1990; Raley 2006).

Conversely, if a male child has a brother, feminized housework will be split amongst the sons, and it will be less associated with “women’s work.” While these effects are present to some extent for female children as well, they are less pronounced because girls tend to be assigned feminized chores and shielded from masculine chores regardless of the gender composition of the household (e.g., Brody and Steelman 1985; Crouter, Manke, and McHale 1995). Evidence from the NLSY also accords with this pattern. Sibling gender has a substantial effect on the tasks assigned to boys but no significant effect on the types of chores that girls are asked to perform.

We hypothesize that experiencing more traditional gender roles in childhood will lead boys to adopt as adults a more conservative viewpoint with respect to gender roles. Lindsey (1997) posits that exposure to the structure of gender roles during childhood perpetuates into adulthood due to social learning. Children are socialized to adopt traditionally male and female behaviors via rewards and punishments within the household. Sociologists refer to these learned patterns of acculturation as “doing gender” (West and Zimmerman 1987).

We further hypothesize that experiencing a family environment with more traditional gender roles will cause males to be more likely to identify as Republicans given that traditional gender-role attitudes are positively correlated with political conservatism (Ciabattari 2001; Howell and Day 2000; Kaufmann 2002; Lye and Waldron 1997). For instance, Ciabattari (2001) shows that compared to men with egalitarian attitudes, those with traditional views on gender roles are 25% more politically conservative on the standard 7-point scale. In addition, the Democratic Party has recently been more supportive of measures to support gender equality and female participation in the workplace, while the Republican Party is often perceived as defending traditional family roles. These differences between the parties have been highlighted by legislation such as the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 and the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 that were adopted during times of unified Democratic control.

As a caveat, we note that the sociological evidence relating to gendered households and male protectionism uniquely apply to political and social attitudes related to the role of women in society. Our posited mechanism would not, for example, apply to men’s empathy toward women more broadly (e.g., Brody and Hall 2010).

Data and Empirical Strategy

Description of Datasets

For the first set of analyses that follow, we use the four-wave PSP. The four waves were conducted in 1965, 1973, 1982, and 1997. In the first wave, most subjects were in their senior year of high school; 98.5% of the sample was between 17 and 19 years old. By 1997, most of the respondents were about 50 years old. The dataset...
has detailed family information, including the gender and age of a respondent’s siblings. These data thus provide the share of a respondent’s siblings who are sisters and the quasi-random indicator for the younger sibling being a sister. Since our empirical strategy is based on the random assignment of younger sibling gender, our estimation sample consists of survey respondents who had at least one younger sibling.

We consider the effect of having sisters on people’s preferences on gender roles and their partisanship. The phrasing of the gender-role question in 1973 was: “Recently, there has been a lot of talk about women’s rights. Some people feel that women should have an equal role with men in running business, industry, and government. Others feel that women’s place is in the home. Where would you place yourself on this scale or haven’t you thought much about this?”

Response options were represented by a scale ranging from 1 (“Women and men should have an equal role”) to 7 (“Women’s place is in the home”). Party identification was asked in the standard way following the question wording used in the American National Election Study (ANES). See online Appendix 1 for all question wordings and response options.

During the first two waves, data were also collected on a sample of the subjects’ parents. We use these data to conduct randomization checks to confirm that having a younger sister (as compared to having a younger brother) does not predict pretreatment baseline characteristics for the PSP sample, as we would predict if younger sibling gender is randomly assigned. These variables indeed are very similar for men (and women) with younger brothers compared to those with younger sisters (see online Appendix 2).

We chose variables that were entirely exogenous — either characteristics of the parents’ own environments when they were children or other characteristics that could not be affected in any way by child gender. In these checks, as with all the regressions using these data, we cluster the standard errors at the primary sampling unit (PSU) level.

To evaluate the robustness of the results from the PSP, we also analyze a completely different dataset: the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth’s Children and Young Adults sample (NLSY79-YA). The NLSY79-YA interviewed the children of the women of the original NLSY79 survey starting in 1986. Questions about gender-role attitudes and political partisanship were asked in the 2006 and 2008 waves, respectively, when respondents were between 21 and 38 years of age. Most of the respondents were on the young side of this range, with the median age for both female and male respondents being 22 in 2006. Most importantly, respondents were asked similar questions about partisanship and the role of women as were asked in the PSP. As a result, we can assess whether the main results from the PSP replicate using an entirely new sample surveyed in recent years. To measure views on gender roles, respondents were presented with the statement “A woman’s place is in the home, not the office or shop” and were asked if they strongly disagree, disagree, agree, or strongly agree with it. In all analyses using the NLSY, we cluster standard errors by mother since sometimes more than one child in a household was interviewed.

Unlike the PSP, the NLSY also contains data on children’s experiences in their early household environment. Starting at the age of 10, the same children who were later asked about their partisanship and political attitudes answered questions about the types of chores they did. As a result, we can use the NLSY to test for differences in the household assignment of tasks according to respondent gender, as well as differences according to sibling gender.

As with the PSP, we first conduct a series of randomization checks. We predict a set of pretreatment characteristics (e.g., mother’s race, mother’s number of siblings, grandmother’s education, etc.). Since all these variables were determined before the younger sibling was born, if the gender of the younger sibling is randomly assigned, it should have no relationship with these variables. Having a younger sister indeed predicts none of these variables in the NLSY, both
for male and female respondents (see online Appendix 2).\textsuperscript{13}

**Empirical Strategy**

Given that we are analyzing a natural experiment, our main specifications are very simple. First, we compare men who have a sister as the next-youngest sibling to men who have a brother as the next-youngest sibling. Likewise, we compare women who have a younger sister to women who have a younger brother. Since we are interested in estimating the overall effect of growing up in an environment with more female siblings, we consider two possibilities that reasonably bracket the effect that siblings have on respondents’ attitudes.

**Assumption 1:** All siblings have the same impact on attitudes.

**Assumption 2:** Any impact that siblings have on attitudes happens entirely through the immediately younger sibling with all other siblings having no effect.

Although we might expect the immediately younger sibling to be somewhat more important than other siblings who are much younger or much older, the sociological literature has posited that parents structure gender roles within the household based on the overall gender composition of children, not singling out adjacent children (see online Appendix 3 for complete details). Therefore, we think that the former assumption is more likely than the latter, but the important point for our purposes is that the truth is likely somewhere in the middle.

The estimate that we obtain under Assumption 1 (all siblings are equally important) represents the upper bound of the effect of growing up with sisters on political attitudes since it implicitly assumes that any sibling will have the same impact as the immediately younger one. The estimate of the effect of having sisters that we obtain under Assumption 2 (younger sibling is all that matters) represents a lower bound since it assigns an effect of zero to all siblings but the next-youngest one. By estimating specifications under each assumption, we thus bracket the true effect of growing up with sisters. As we show below, under both assumptions the estimated effects are statistically significant and substantively meaningful.

We first consider the model specification under Assumption 1. Define $S_i$ to be the share of a respondent’s siblings who are female. Where $P_i$ is the respondent’s gender role attitude or partisanship and $X_i$ represents controls for family size (explained below), our specification is:

$$ P_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 S_i + aX_i + u_i. \quad (1) $$

Here, the regression is not identified by ordinary least squares (OLS) since the share of a respondent’s siblings who are sisters is endogenous for the reasons described earlier (e.g., stopping rules). However, under Assumption 1, all siblings have an impact only through the overall gender makeup of the household. Therefore, we have an ideal instrumental variable for $S_i$, namely a dummy variable indicating whether the younger sibling is female. This variable, which we call $Z_i$, is both randomly assigned and strongly correlated with the endogenous variable of interest in equation (1). It also satisfies the other requirements for a valid instrumental variable, as we describe in detail in online Appendix 3. Therefore, we estimate equation (1) using two-stage least squares (2SLS) as the estimation method.

Under Assumption 2, we simply need to regress a respondent’s attitudes on a dummy variable for the younger sibling being female. Our regression equation is:

$$ P_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Z_i + aX_i + u_i. \quad (2) $$

Since we have an experimental environment, the regression is identified by OLS. In the equation, $\beta_1$ is the parameter of interest, representing the effect of having a younger sister on a respondent’s gender roles attitude or partisanship.\textsuperscript{14}

In the discussion that follows, we refer to equation (1) as the *instrumental variables* regression and equation (2) as the *reduced-form* regression. We obtain results that are nearly the same in terms of statistical significance under both specifications. For both dependent variables, we rescale respondents’ answers to range from 0 to 1, with 1 representing the most conservative position.

The results remain essentially the same if we include additional control variables in the regressions. As emphasized earlier, the natural experiment of child gender should ensure that control variables are not necessary. Still, as a robustness check, we

\textsuperscript{13}The omnibus test statistic fails to reject the hypothesis that the gender of the younger sibling is randomly assigned ($p = .436$ for male respondents, $p = .642$ for female respondents). In Figure S1 in the online appendix, we also include simple plots to illustrate that the balance statistics are what we would expect under random assignment (Rosenbaum 2010).

\textsuperscript{14}For ease of interpretation and to avoid making additional modeling assumptions (Angrist and Pischke 2009), we use OLS as the estimation method. Results are nearly identical if an ordered logit (or standard logit for dichotomous items) is used instead.
estimated a range of specifications with controls for other pretreatment demographic variables. One particularly interesting covariate that we consider is parental attitudes, which we include to assess whether we are simply picking up parent-child transmission. The main results for each dataset remain almost exactly the same when control variables are included (see online Appendix 7).

### Econometrics of Family Size

The share of a respondent’s siblings who are sisters depends on family size in that the number of possible values for the sister-share variable increases when family size goes up. For example, the support of this variable for a respondent with only one sibling is \{0, 1\} whereas the support for a respondent with four siblings is \{0, 1/4, 1/2, 3/4, 1\}. In this sense, the natural experiment is blocked within family size.

While the share of siblings who are sisters is not correlated in a linear way with the number of siblings a respondent has—the correlation coefficient is .002 in the PSP and .033 in the NLSY (see online Appendix 4)—we could be concerned that the effect of the independent variable is conditional on family size.\(^{15}\) To ensure that the sister-share variable is not capturing effects that should actually be attributed to family size, we report specifications that control for the respondent’s number of siblings (1) linearly and (2) nonlinearly with fixed effects for family size. In the fixed-effect regressions, due to the small number (2) nonlinearly with fixed effects for family size. In the fixed-effect regressions, due to the small number of observations for each family size. The effects that should actually be attributed to family size. The estimates then reflect the average effect across the family sizes, weighted by the number of observations for each family size. The effects that should actually be attributed to family size.

### The Effect of Sisters on Political Attitudes

#### First-Stage Results

As described above, our empirical strategy exploits the quasi-random assignment of the indicator for the younger sibling being female. Earlier, we presented evidence that this variable is indeed randomly assigned by showing that respondents whose younger sibling was a sister were similar to respondents whose younger sibling was a brother on a host of pretreatment baseline characteristics. Not surprisingly, the first stage for the instrumental variables regression shows that the instrument is very strong (see Table S3 in the online appendix). In the PSP, regressing the share of a respondent’s siblings who are female on a dummy variable for the next-youngest sibling being female gives a coefficient of .489 and a \(t\)-statistic of 24.1 \((p < .0001)\).\(^{16}\) In other words, a respondent’s next sibling being a sister leads to a respondent having a share of female siblings that is 48.9 percentage points higher than if the next sibling was a brother. Specifically, respondents whose next sibling is a sister grow up with on average 73% of their siblings being female, whereas people whose next sibling is a brother grow up with on average 24% female siblings. We obtain a similarly strong first stage for the NLSY. We use this difference to identify the impact of growing up in an environment with more female siblings.

### Attitudes on Gender Roles

To examine gender-role attitudes, we first analyze data from 1973, the year when respondents in the PSP first answered detailed questions about their views on the topic. As shown in the first column of Table 1 where we control for the number of siblings linearly, having more female siblings makes young men more conservative with respect to gender roles. The coefficient estimate of .171 \((p = .046, \text{two-tailed})\) indicates that compared to men with all brothers, growing up with all sisters shifted men’s positions towards the conservative end of the gender-role scale by 17.1% of the 0–1 range of the dependent variable. This represents about a full category on the 7-point response scale. We obtain similar results when controlling for family size with fixed effects (see column 2).\(^{17}\) We also find that having a younger sister makes men more conservative in their gender-role attitudes when estimating the reduced-form models under Assumption 2 (see columns 3 and 4). The effect sizes are 7.9–8.3%, about half the size of the estimates from the 2SLS regressions. As described

\(^{15}\) Additional discussion of the econometrics of family size (as well as the distribution of siblings according to family size) appears in online Appendix 4.

\(^{16}\) This \(t\)-statistic is larger than the rough threshold of 10 that puts instruments in the “safe zone” of avoiding bias (Angrist and Pischke 2009; Stock, Wright, and Yogo 2002).

\(^{17}\) We collapse the highest fixed effect to represent respondents with seven or more siblings.
Table 1 The Effect of Having Sisters on Gender-Role Attitudes for the Political Socialization Panel

### A. Attitudes in 1973 and 1982

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1973 Gender-Role Attitude</th>
<th></th>
<th>1982 Gender-Role Attitude</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IV Regression</td>
<td>Reduced Form</td>
<td>IV Regression</td>
<td>Reduced Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male Respondents</td>
<td>Effect of having sisters compared to brothers</td>
<td>.171</td>
<td>(.084)</td>
<td>.161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>p = .046</td>
<td>n = 279</td>
<td>p = .062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Linear control for number of siblings?</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fixed effects for number of siblings?</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female Respondents</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.054</td>
<td>(.083)</td>
<td>-.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>p = .518</td>
<td>n = 331</td>
<td>p = .587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Linear control for number of siblings?</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fixed effects for number of siblings?</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### B. Attitudes in 1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1997 Gender-Role Attitude: Original Question</th>
<th></th>
<th>1997 Gender-Role Attitude: New Question</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IV Regression</td>
<td>Reduced Form</td>
<td>IV Regression</td>
<td>Reduced Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(9)</td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>(11)</td>
<td>(12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male Respondents</td>
<td>Effect of having sisters compared to brothers</td>
<td>.037</td>
<td>(.051)</td>
<td>.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>p = .462</td>
<td>n = 281</td>
<td>p = .491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Linear control for number of siblings?</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fixed effects for number of siblings?</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female Respondents</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.067</td>
<td>(.057)</td>
<td>-.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>p = .243</td>
<td>n = 331</td>
<td>p = .299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Linear control for number of siblings?</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fixed effects for number of siblings?</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The instrumental variable in each IV regression is a binary variable for whether the younger sibling is a sister (0 = brother, 1 = sister). Those regressions are estimated by 2SLS. The reduced form regressions are estimated by OLS with the binary variable for the younger sibling’s gender as the independent variable. In regressions 1-12, the dependent variable is the respondent’s gender role attitude in 1973, rescaled from 0 to 1, with 1 corresponding to the response that a “woman’s place is in the home.” In regressions 13-16, the dependent variable is the respondent’s position on whether mothers should remain at home with young children (1 = strongly agree). All standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for clustering at the PSU level.
earlier, these OLS estimates represent lower bounds on the effect of having sisters on gender-role attitudes, while the 2SLS estimates are the upper bounds.\footnote{Respondents were also asked where they would place other men on the scale. Having more sisters causes male respondents to perceive other men to be .137 units more conservative with respect to women’s roles \((p = .037)\), consistent with the false consensus effect where people project their own attitudes onto others (Ross, Greene, and House 1977). The findings are robust to including a complete set of family-size fixed effects. Once again, the reduced-form estimates are about half the size of the \(p = .037)\), consistent with the false consensus effect where people project their own attitudes onto others (Ross, Greene, and House 1977). The findings are robust to including a complete set of family-size fixed effects. Once again, the reduced-form estimates are about half the size of the 2SLS estimates and nearly the same in terms of statistical significance. See online Appendix 5 for complete results.}

At the same time, sibling gender has no effect on women’s gender-role attitudes in 1973 as shown in the regressions for the female respondents. Women who grew up with sisters appear to be similarly conservative as women who grew up with brothers. We cannot reject the hypothesis of equality at any standard significance level \((p = .518\) in column one). The effect of having sisters on males’ gender-role attitudes for the standard question persists through 1982. As shown in the fifth column of Table 1, having sisters caused men to be 13.5\% more conservative in 1982 on the same gender-role question that was asked in 1973 \((p = .043)\). As shown in column 6, the results are robust to including family-size fixed effects.\footnote{The effect is even larger for people’s recollections of how they reported their gender roles opinions in the earlier survey. In 1982, men with sisters perceive themselves to have been 25.7\% more conservative in 1973 than men with brothers. See online Appendix 5 for complete results.}

We also obtain similar results in terms of statistical significance in the reduced-form regressions. Finally, we again find no effect of sisters for female respondents.

As shown in the bottom half of Table 1, by 1997 the effect of having sisters on men’s opinions on the repeated gender-role question is no longer significant \((p = .462)\). This diminished effect may be due in part to a change in the distribution of answers to the question caused by shifting norms on what constitutes a socially desirable response. By 1997, only one man out of 454 responded that “a woman’s place is in the home” (a 7 on the 7-point scale), and 78.2\% of respondents chose 1 or 2, the two options closest to “women should have an equal role with men in running business, industry, and government.” In 1973, there was considerably more variation in responses. 7.6\% of men chose the extreme “a woman’s place is in the home” response option, and only 50.6\% of respondents selected points 1 or 2.\footnote{Indeed, the data provide little evidence that the preference ranking of people’s opinions on this question actually changed from 1973 to 1997. If we run a Wilcoxon signed-ranks test comparing the preference ordering for the 1973 gender roles question to the preference ordering for the 1997 question, we get a \(p\)-value of .464 \((N = 912)\).}

However, another question about gender roles was asked in 1997 where responses may be less subject to social desirability effects. For this question, we find a similar effect of having sisters on gender-role attitudes as we found in 1973 and 1982 for the other question. In 1997, respondents were asked the following question: “Mothers should remain at home with young children and not work outside the home. Do you agree or disagree?” “Agree” responses are indicative of more conservative viewpoints on gender roles, but they are less likely to be associated with explicit sexism than expressing the opinion that a woman’s place is in the home. Respondents were asked to answer the question on a scale from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree). There is much greater variation in men’s responses to this question than the gender-role question repeated from 1973. For the five categories (“agree strongly,” “agree somewhat,” “neither agree nor disagree,” “disagree somewhat,” and “disagree strongly”), the percentages of men giving each answer were 9.2, 25.2, 16.8, 29.1, and 19.7, respectively. As shown in the bottom half of Table 1, for this new gender-role question, having sisters causes men to be 16.5 percentage points \((p = .031)\) more conservative. These results are consistent across specifications; the reduced-form estimates are again about half the size of the 2SLS estimates. For this question in 1997, we also find a marginally significant effect of the opposite sign for female respondents. Since no similar effects emerge for female respondents on any other gender role questions or for partisanship, we think these results do no generalize.

\textbf{Partisanship}

Similarly, having sisters causes young men to be more likely to identify as Republicans. Table 2 presents the results for partisanship, where the 7-point measure is rescaled to range from 0 to 1, with 1 corresponding to being a strong Republican. The results suggest that having sisters affected partisanship for men only in early adulthood, in contrast to the more persistent effect that sisters have on men’s gender-role attitudes. In 1965, male respondents with all sisters are 14.9 percentage points, or about one category on the 7-point partisanship scale, more likely to identify as Republicans. Table 2 presents the results for partisanship, where the 7-point measure is rescaled to range from 0 to 1, with 1 corresponding to being a strong Republican. The results suggest that having sisters affected partisanship for men only in early adulthood, in contrast to the more persistent effect that sisters have on men’s gender-role attitudes. In 1965, male respondents with all sisters are 14.9 percentage points, or about one category on the 7-point partisanship scale, more likely to identify as Republicans.
Table 2: The Effect of Having Sisters on Partisanship for the Political Socialization Panel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1965 Partisanship</th>
<th>1973 partisanship</th>
<th>1997 Partisanship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IV Regression</td>
<td>Reduced Form</td>
<td>IV Regression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male Respondents</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effect of having sisters compared to brothers</td>
<td>.149 (0.078)</td>
<td>.15 (0.078)</td>
<td>.073 (0.037)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linear control for number of siblings?</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed effects for number of siblings?</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                      |                   |                   |                   |                   |                   |                   |
| Female Respondents   |                   |                   |                   |                   |                   |                   |
| Effect of having sisters compared to brothers | .031 (0.075) | .021 (0.072) | .015 (0.037) | .01 (0.036) | .038 (0.067) | .035 (0.066) | .019 (0.033) | .018 (0.033) | -.024 (0.067) | -.025 (0.066) | -.012 (0.033) | -.013 (0.033) |
| Linear control for number of siblings? | Y                | N                 | Y                 | N                 | Y                 | N                 | Y                 | N                 | Y                 | N                 | Y                 |
| Fixed effects for number of siblings? | N                | Y                 | N                 | Y                 | N                 | Y                 | N                 | Y                 | N                 | Y                 | Y                 |

Note: The instrumental variable in columns 1, 2, 5, 6, 9, and 10 is a binary variable for whether the younger sibling is a sister (0 = brother, 1 = sister). Those regressions are estimated by 2SLS. The regressions in columns 3, 4, 7, 8, 11, and 12 are estimated by OLS with the binary variable for the younger sibling’s gender as the independent variable. In columns 1-4, the dependent variable is the respondent’s partisanship in 1965 on a seven-point scale, rescaled from 0 to 1, with 1 corresponding to a strong Republican. The results in columns 5-8 refer to a respondent’s partisanship in 1973, and the results in columns 9-12 refer to a respondent’s partisanship in 1997. All standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for clustering at the PSU level.
than respondents with all brothers ($p = .060$, column 1). The effect dissipates to 8.2 percentage points by 1973 ($p = .195$, column 5). The large $p$-value is a product of the relatively small PSP sample (and the small number of PSUs). This point estimate is similar to the strongly significant one we later find for partisanship in the larger NLSY sample that was collected from respondents who were also primarily in their early 20s. However, we are better able to distinguish the effect size from zero in the NLSY due to increased statistical power. In 1982 and 1997 for the PSP, the effect of sibling gender on partisanship continues to diminish so that the point estimate approaches zero in later years.21 Sibling gender thus appears to affect men’s party identification but only significantly so in the first wave of the data. Again, having sisters has no discernible effect on female respondents (see bottom panel of Table 2).

**Household Chores**

The 1997 wave also provides some indirect evidence on why the observed effects for gender-role attitudes and partisanship may occur. In 1997, respondents in the PSP were asked if they or their spouses did more of the household chores. Consistent with the idea that boys with sisters were asked to do fewer household chores and that such learned childhood behavior carries over into adulthood, men with sisters appear to do less household work, even in middle age. In these data, men with all sisters were 17 percentage points ($p = .063$) more likely to say that their spouse did more housework compared to men with all brothers, suggesting that the gendered environment from childhood may have permanently altered men’s conception of gender roles and, consequently, their political opinions.22 More detailed questions about chores conducted during childhood are found in the NLSY data, reported below.

All of the results remain largely the same when we include a series of control variables (see online Appendix 7). Likewise, we find suggestive evidence that having sisters makes men in the PSP more conservative on other issues in addition to gender roles (see online Appendix 8).

**Gender Roles and Partisanship in the NLSY**

We investigate here whether the results from the PSP replicate in a different sample that is a generation younger and was interviewed in a more gender-equal era. As shown in Table 3, we find that having sisters made men in the NLSY sample more likely to express conservative attitudes with respect to gender roles. The NLSY asked a similar gender-role question about whether a “woman’s place is in the home” to the one asked in the PSP, but with four response options ranging from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree,” rather than a 7-point scale. We again rescale the answers to range from 0 to 1. As in the last wave of the PSP, there is relatively little variation in people’s responses to this question. Of respondents, 88% disagreed or strongly disagreed. Even with the limited variation, the larger sample size in the NLSY makes it possible to detect an effect of having sisters on young men’s views on this question. Compared to men with all brothers, men with all sisters were 3.9 percentage points more likely to agree with the statement that “a woman’s place is in the home” ($p = .044$, column 1 of Table 3). We obtain similar results when including fixed effects for family size ($p = .054$, column 2).23 As in the PSP, the reduced-form estimates are about half the size of the 2SLS estimates (columns 3 and 4). As shown in the bottom panel of Table 3, we did not observe significant effects for female respondents.

 Likewise, as shown in Table 4, men with sisters are more likely to identify as Republicans. Having sisters made male respondents 5.9 percentage points more Republican ($p = .044$, column 1). We find a similar estimate in column 2, where we include family-size fixed effects. The reduced-form estimates are reported in columns 3 and 4. The $p$-values are similar across the different specifications. As shown in the lower half of Table 4, the corresponding effects of sisters on partisanship for female respondents are smaller and not statistically significant. Overall, the results are similar to those from the PSP for respondents of a similar age over 30 years earlier. Having sisters appears to make young men more likely to support traditional gender roles and more likely to identify as Republicans.

**Household Chores in the NLSY**

In addition to making replication of the PSP results possible, the NLSY child sample includes unusually detailed data on childhood experiences that provide evidence of one of the potential mechanisms underlying the results we identified in both datasets. As

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1. To conserve space, we only report the results from the 1997 wave in Table 2. The results for the 1982 wave are presented in online Appendix 6.

2. See online Appendix 9 for complete results.

21. Due to the limited number of large families in the NLSY, we collapse the highest fixed effect to represent respondents with six or more siblings.
discussed earlier, sibling gender composition appears to affect the ways in which parents treat their children. Younger sisters have been found to make male siblings less likely to be assigned to female-stereotyped tasks. In the NLSY sample, this effect emerges in a striking way for boys.

First, we describe the gender differences in the assignment of household tasks. The NLSY asked about four chores in the supplemental data collected from children. We consider the answers given by the children in the sample from the first time the questions were asked in 1988 until the last time in 1996. For children who answer the questions in multiple years, we take the average answer given across the years so that our regressions are based on a single observation per respondent.

Children who were 10 years of age or older were asked if they regularly helped with straightening out their room, keeping the rest of the house clean, doing dishes, and cooking. Girls are more likely than boys to perform each of these tasks, but the differences are substantially larger for one variable than for the others: doing the dishes. Considering everyone in the sample who had a younger sibling, 60% of boys responded that they helped with the dishes, compared to 82.2% of girls (p < .001).

We also separately considered the results for children who were at least 12 years old because these were children’s self-reports, and there is likely less measurement error in responses for children who are 12 and older than for the 10 and 11 year olds. Boys with younger siblings who were at least 12 years old were 23.1% less likely to help with the dishes than girls who also had younger siblings and were at least 12 years old (p < .001).

Having identified a task that boys are less likely to perform than girls, we now consider how having sisters rather than brothers impacts whether a child performs the task. For the entire sample, we see that boys with all sisters are predicted to be 6.6% less likely to perform each of these tasks, but the differences are substantially larger for one variable than for the others: doing the dishes. Considering everyone in the sample who had a younger sibling, 60% of boys responded that they helped with the dishes, compared to 82.2% of girls (p < .001).

Table 3: The Effect of Having Sisters on Gender-Role Attitudes for the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>IV Regression (1)</th>
<th>IV Regression (2)</th>
<th>Reduced Form (3)</th>
<th>Reduced Form (4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Male Respondents</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effect of having sisters compared to brothers</td>
<td>.039</td>
<td>.038</td>
<td>.021</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p = .044</td>
<td>p = .054</td>
<td>p = .044</td>
<td>p = .054</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=1940</td>
<td>N=1940</td>
<td>N=1940</td>
<td>N=1940</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linear control for number of siblings?</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed effects for number of siblings?</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Female Respondents</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effect of having sisters compared to brothers</td>
<td>.023</td>
<td>.027</td>
<td>.013</td>
<td>.015</td>
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<td>p = .219</td>
<td>p = .161</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=1979</td>
<td>N=1979</td>
<td>N=1979</td>
<td>N=1979</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linear control for number of siblings?</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed effects for number of siblings?</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The instrumental variable in columns 1 and 2 is a binary variable for whether the younger sibling is a brother or sister (0 = brother, 1 = sister). Those regressions are estimated by 2SLS. The regressions in columns 3 and 4 are estimated by OLS with the binary variable for the younger sibling’s gender as the independent variable. All standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for clustering at the level of the mother. The dependent variable is the respondent’s gender role attitude, rescaled from 0 to 1, with 1 corresponding to strongly agreeing that a “woman’s place is in the home.”

24We take the average of the younger sister variable across the years with chore data for each respondent. Only one respondent with chore data has a change in their younger sister variable from one chore response to the next. Results remain essentially identical if that respondent is dropped.

25The chore with the next-largest gender difference—cooking—had a gap of 13% between boys and girls.

26Since children filled out these questionnaires on their own, it is plausible that there would be more issues with accurate reporting for younger children. On the other hand, if there were reasons that children might choose to deliberately misreport their behavior, we might expect younger children to perhaps be less likely to engage in that behavior.
likely to do dishes than boys with all brothers ($p = .09$, column 1 of Table 5). If we consider only boys who were at least 12 years old when they answered the question, boys with sisters are 9.2% less likely to do dishes ($p = .044$, column 2). As shown in the third and fourth columns of Table 5, the effects are about half as large but still statistically significant in the reduced-form regressions.

As was the case for the political questions in both the PSP and the NLSY, these effects occur only for the male respondents in the sample. Sisters have no discernible effect on whether females in the sample performed the female-stereotyped task, and the point estimates are close to zero (see bottom panel of Table 5).

The results provide clear evidence that male respondents in the NLSY had substantially different childhood experiences depending on whether they had sisters or brothers. For a task that girls were much more likely to do in childhood, males with sisters were much less likely to perform that task than males with brothers. The pattern in the data thus suggests a potential mechanism underlying our findings.\(^{27}\)

### Conclusion

In summary, we find that having sisters makes males more politically conservative in terms of gender-role attitudes and partisanship. Particularly for gender-role attitudes, we find that these effects persist into adulthood. Since sibling gender is randomly assigned, we can interpret our results as causal evidence that the household environment (cleaned of genetics, social forces, and other such omitted variables) influences political attitudes.

Our results provide a new perspective on the extant literature on political socialization in the household. Studies on parental influence generally have shown homogenization in that children’s attitudes become aligned with their parents’ beliefs.

\(^{27}\)The regressions in Table 5 control for the number of siblings nonlinearly via fixed effects. We obtain similar results when including family size linearly (see online Appendix 9).

\(^{28}\)If we regress a respondent’s partisanship on the variable representing whether he or she helped out with the dishes, we find that performing the female-stereotyped task predicts that male respondents are more Democratic with no similar effect for female respondents. This result could, of course, be driven by the endogeneity of the assignment of household tasks.

---

**Table 4** The Effect of Having Sisters on Partisanship for the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>IV Regression</th>
<th>Reduced Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male Respondents</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effect of having sisters compared to brothers</td>
<td>.059 (0.029)</td>
<td>.056 (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$p = .044$</td>
<td>$p = .057$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linear control for number of siblings?</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed effects for number of siblings?</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                     | (3)           | (4)          |
| Female Respondents  | (5)           | (6)          |
| Effect of having sisters compared to brothers | .011 (0.027) | .011 (0.027) |
|                     | $p = .674$    | $p = .676$   |
| Linear control for number of siblings? | Y             | N            |
| Fixed effects for number of siblings? | N             | Y            |

Note: The instrumental variable in columns 1 and 2 is a binary variable for whether the younger sibling is a brother or sister (0 = brother, 1 = sister). Those regressions are estimated by 2SLS. The regressions in columns 3 and 4 are estimated by OLS with the binary variable for the younger sibling’s gender as the independent variable. All standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for clustering at the level of the mother. The dependent variable is a respondent’s partisanship on a seven-point scale, rescaled from 0 to 1, with 1 corresponding to a strong Republican.
However, our findings instead show how the childhood environment can push family members’ attitudes in different ways, potentially leading to ideological heterogeneity within the household.

Further, this article has highlighted an often-ignored aspect of the household environment that can substantially affect political socialization. While an extensive amount of research has explored how attitudes are transmitted from parent to child, we show that siblings can influence each other as well. Recent research in education has underscored the importance of peers more broadly on educational outcomes (e.g., Calvo-Armengol, Patacchini, and Zenou 2009; Zimmerman 2003). Our results suggest that peers within the household may have similarly sized effects on political attitudes and identities.

By pointing towards the importance of the childhood environment, our quasi-experimental results support previous findings that experiences early in life play an important role in the development of political identity. Subsequent work can apply our general technique of looking for a quasi-experimental situation to revisit studies of the parent-child relationship in addition to other aspects of the childhood experience. Natural experiments have proved valuable for demonstrating effects that major life events and exposure to partisan media have on people’s policy views (e.g., Della Vigna and Kaplan 2007; Erikson and Stoker 2011). These sorts of effects may be particularly important when children’s political identities are being formed. As we have shown for sibling gender, natural experiments that isolate specific explanatory variables may help to identify important aspects of the complicated process of political socialization.

### Acknowledgments

We thank John Bullock, Richard Fox, Donald Green, Kent Jennings, Rebecca Morton, Erik Snowberg, Laura Stoker, Kent Tedin, Robert Urbatsch, Ebonya Washington, the editors, anonymous reviewers, and participants at the 2011 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.

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The Development of Dual Loyalties: Immigrants’ Integration to Canadian Regional Dynamics

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NEIL NEVITTE University of Toronto

Introduction

Regionalism, the presence of systematic variations in regional political cultures and the existence of regional cleavages, is a central feature of Canadian politics. At the heart of regionalism lie tensions between popular loyalties to federal and provincial governments. As Clarke and colleagues explain (1980: 35), loyalty to the regions and not to the country as a whole was a basic reason why the Fathers of Canada crafted a confederation. Since then, Canadians exhibit a “will to live together” and a “will to live apart” (LaSelva, 1996) and consistently balance those distinct and potentially conflicting loyalties to their province and to the country. This is a fundamental part of the basic dynamics of Canadian regionalism and hence of Canadian politics.

Whether regional political cultures and cleavages between dual loyalties are attributable to different settlement patterns (Elkins and Simeon, 1980; Schwartz, 1974; Wiseman, 1996), fundamental regional economic differences (Brodie, 1990; Brym, 1986; Wilson, 1974) or Canada’s federal political institutions (Simeon and Elkins, 1974) remains a focus

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of vigorous debate. That said, most acknowledge that variations in the origins, timing and settlement patterns of large flows of immigrants to Canada have had a marked impact on the development of Canadian political culture and, more specifically, regional subcultures (Blake, 1972; Simeon and Elkins, 1974: 433; Elkins and Simeon, 1980; Lipset, 1990; Wiseman, 1996, 2007). Such immigrant waves as the early settlement of New France, the migration of loyalists from the American colonies to Ontario, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia in the 1780s, and the movement of Americans and Central and Eastern Europeans to Ontario and Western Canada in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century are all thought to have a profound impact on the dominant political outlooks of these regions.

Substantial attention has been paid to understanding the origins of cleavages between these dual loyalties, but relatively few efforts have been directed at exploring the contemporary dynamics of regionalism in Canada. This analysis directly explores the interplay between these two central features of Canada’s political dynamics, namely regionalism and immigration. More specifically, the focus is on how contemporary immigrants navigate the dynamics of orientations towards the federal and provincial governments. Previous research examining whether dual loyalties induce identity conflict found that Canadians accommodate these dual loyalties reasonably well (Clarke et al., 1980: 68). But does the same hold for new Canadians? Do immigrants develop political loyalties that are centripetal or centrifugal? Are these newcomers more federally or provincially oriented than their native-born counterparts living in the same province? And what impact do these new Canadians have on regional dynamics of political loyalties?

There are good reasons to suppose that contemporary immigration patterns have the potential to significantly transform these regional dynamics. Both the magnitude of immigration flows and the settlement patterns of new immigrants have changed considerably in recent decades. First, immigrants made up some 19.8 per cent of the Canadian population in 2006, and as the data in Figure 1 indicate, immigration has contributed to more than half of Canada’s population growth since the 1960s. The proportion of population growth due to immigration peaked at just over 85 per cent between 1996 and 2001, a level not seen since immigration waves in the early part of the twentieth century with the settlement of the Western provinces. Second, the settlement patterns of immigrants to Canada have shifted significantly in recent years. The longstanding pattern was that Ontario has been the overwhelming destination of choice for the majority of immigrants. Ontario remains the province of choice for most immigrants, but Quebec, British Columbia and Alberta have experienced recent rapid growth in their foreign-born populations. Third, these shifts have also been accompanied by significant changes in the
composition of Canada’s immigrant population over the last 40 years. The founding waves of immigrants came from traditional source countries, Europe and the United States. The contemporary record is different. The vast majority of new immigrants now come from non-traditional source countries in Asia, the Middle East and Africa (Chui et al., 2007).

Given the volume, the sharp shift in country of origin and the significant changes in settlement patterns, it is reasonable to suppose that these new waves of immigrants have the potential to reshape regional political dynamics. As with previous waves of immigration, the inflow of new Canadians potentially brings an influx of distinct values and ways of relating to political institutions. The values of today’s immigrants are likely to become an important part of Canada’s future political culture. What impact, then, do these new patterns of immigration have on Canadian political culture and more specifically on regional dynamics in the country?

Regionalism and immigration are two central features of Canada’s political system, but systematic empirical explorations of the relationship between the two remain relatively rare. One exception is Elkins’ pioneering investigation (1980) into whether immigrants develop atti-
Elkins’ central finding was that immigrants generally did adjust to provincial political norms, but his data also showed that provincial patterns were less pronounced among immigrants. According to Elkins, “regional and provincial variations have, if anything, been muted by the vast numbers of immigrants to Canada” (122). Elkins’ insights focused on such core aspects of political culture as political efficacy and trust, and they relied entirely on data collected in the 1960s and 1970s and thus on immigrants who settled in Canada during the 1940s and 1950s. Given the recent transformations in immigration patterns it is not at all clear that these original findings provide a firm foundation for generalizing about more contemporary dynamics. The present analysis revisits the question and explores immigrants’ federal and provincial loyalties from two vantage points. The first focuses on immigrants from traditional source countries, the group that most closely approximates the subjects of Elkins’ study. The second focus is on immigrants from non-traditional source countries. Not only is this group increasingly prominent in contemporary Canadian immigration, it is also more culturally distinct from the country’s native-born population.

**Figure 1**
Population Growth Due to Immigration (% Change from Previous Census)

Sources: Statistics Canada 2009; Chui et al. 2007

Note: Data from 1901 to 1951 are in 10-year increments; Data after 1951 are in 5-year increments
The process of immigrants’ political integration is complex and it involves many factors that may or may not entail acculturation (Berry, 2001). Through acculturation immigrants undergo both “culture shedding” and “culture learning” (Berry, 1997); immigrants “unlearn” some orientations acquired in their previous cultural context, while “learning” and adopting the new attitudes and orientations that reflect their new cultural context. Empirical evidence from Canada (Black, 1987; Black et al., 1987; White et al., 2008) and elsewhere (Finifter and Finifter, 1989; McAllister and Makkai, 1991, 1992; Bilodeau, 2008) supports this perspective. On balance, the data indicate that although immigrants’ pre-migration backgrounds tend to influence their political outlooks in the new host country, immigrants are nonetheless adept at political learning in the host society. Thus, the acquisition of political loyalties should be part of the achievable culture learning menu available to immigrants in the new host society. But which political loyalties are absorbed and which ones are not?

One possibility is that immigrants’ cultural learning in the Canadian setting entails internalizing provincial-level political norms and values. A large body of empirical research demonstrates that local interpersonal communication networks are vital to the formation of political attitudes and behaviours. People tend to develop political attitudes that are consistent with the local majority opinion that surrounds them daily (Huckfeldt et al., 1998); and people still favour interpersonal communication over other means of acquiring political information (Beck et al., 2002; McClung, 2003). Evidence from internal migrants in the United States, for example, indicates that, when it comes to racial attitudes and partisanship, people who move to new environments (states or neighbourhoods) tend to adopt attitudes that resemble those of the local surrounding population (Glaser and Gilens, 1997; McBurnett, 1991; MacKuen and Brown, 1987; Brown, 1981; Markus, 1979). The precise dynamics of this acculturation process remain somewhat unclear, but one possibility is that immigrants take on the norms and attitudes of their new local environments to lower the costs of “fitting in” to their new contexts (MacKuen and Brown, 1987; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1987; Huckfeldt et al., 1995). Applied to the Canadian case, this line of reasoning implies that immigrants will adopt provincial and federal loyalties that mirror those of the local population within their respective provinces and that interprovincial differences in political loyalties among Canadian-born citizens are consequently reproduced among immigrants.

The dynamics of immigrants’ acculturation, however, are quite different from those of political socialization among non-immigrant Cana-
dians, and this encourages the expectation that immigrants might hold political views that are distinct from those of the local population within their respective provinces.

The inculcation of core political norms and values through such socialization agents as schools and the family typically occurs during childhood and adolescence, the early stages of the life cycle (Greenstein, 1965; Hess and Torney, 1967; Easton and Dennis, 1969). But immigrants typically arrive during later stages in the life cycle. Thus immigrants have not necessarily been inculcated with the same core values and norms as those found within the local populations of their new host settings. Indeed, when it comes to new immigrants who originate from non-traditional source countries, it is more likely that the discrepancies between the value sets of immigrants and native-born Canadians will be greater than the differences between immigrants from traditional source countries and native-born Canadians.

Furthermore, immigrants often have different preoccupations than the local population both upon arrival (for example, employment and housing) and subsequently when faced with the challenges of adapting to the new host society (such as discrimination and marginalization). It is these distinct sets of concerns that frequently encourage immigrants to join local networks and associations for mutual support. Thus, studies of immigrants’ integration show that ethnic networks and associations play a powerful role for newcomers (Fennema and Tillie, 1999).

Given these different points of reference and distinct settlement challenges, immigrants face choices during the course of adapting to new political settings. The evidence seems to be that immigrants select adaptive strategies that strike a balance between the desire to fit into the new host society and ensure a successful settlement and the desire to retain their own distinctive norms and values (Berry et al., 1987; Berry, 1997).

As Berry explains:

In all plural societies, cultural groups and their individual members, in both the dominant and non-dominant situations, must deal with the issue of how to acculturate. Strategies with respect to two major issues are usually worked out by groups and individuals in their daily encounters with each other. These issues are cultural maintenance (to what extent are cultural identity and characteristics considered to be important, and their maintenance strived for); and contact and participation (to what extent should they become involved in other cultural groups, or remain primarily among themselves). (1997: 9)

The development of political loyalties among immigrants is thus likely to be influenced by adaptation strategies and social network dynamics. These strategies and dynamics, we suggest, increase the chances that new immigrants might acquire distinctive federal–provincial outlooks. One possibility is that immigrants might be inclined to internalize political
outlooks that favour the federal pole. The Canadian federal government’s multiculturalism policy offers immigrants an alternative pathway to social and political integration by legitimizing the retention of aspects of immigrants’ pre-migration identity (Kymlicka, 1995, 1998). The symbolic value of this policy of multiculturalism, which acknowledges and accepts a multiplicity of cultural models, thus presents attractive re-socialization alternatives to newcomers in Canada. The multiculturalism policy, in effect, not only validates immigrants’ pre-migration cultural identity and characteristics, but in doing so also lowers the cost of fitting in socially, economically and culturally.

The implication of this alternative line of speculation is that, irrespective of their province of residence, immigrants may be more inclined to develop federal loyalties rather than provincial ones. Furthermore, given the shorter period of residence and the greater cultural and ethnic differences with the Canadian-born population, the multicultural model might be even more attractive to immigrants from non-traditional source countries than their counterparts from traditional source countries. If that were the case then these immigrants might be more likely than others to develop stronger federal loyalties, thus attenuating interprovincial differences in political loyalties.

Research Design and Data

The analysis proceeds in two stages. The first stage focuses on the question of whether immigrants in each province are systematically more likely than their Canadian-born co-residents to gravitate towards the federal pole. More specifically, it examines whether immigrants in each province adopt political loyalties that are more provincially or federally oriented than the local population in the province where they reside. The second stage of the analysis assesses whether provincial cleavages in political loyalties—systematic interprovincial differences in federal–provincial orientations—are more or less similar among Canadian-born citizens and immigrant Canadians. In this instance, the focus is on whether immigrants reproduce, or alter, regional cleavages in Canada. If the cleavages observed among immigrants across all four provinces are similar to those observed among the Canadian-born population, then the conclusion would be that immigrants simply reproduce existing regional cleavages. However, if the cleavages observed among immigrants across all four provinces vary substantially from those observed among the Canadian-born population, then the implication is that contemporary immigration patterns do have the potential to alter regional cleavages.

The analysis focuses on four dimensions of political loyalties. Following Clarke and colleagues (1980) the first three dimensions directly
concern respondents’ relationship to Canada, the federal government and the provincial governments. Western Canadian citizens’ alienation from Canada’s centre and Quebec citizens’ alienation from the federal government are well documented (Clarke et al., 1980; Gibbins, 1982; Henry, 2002). There has been longstanding debate about the integration and powers of some regions or provinces within the federation as well as about the real or perceived unequal treatment that provinces received historically from the federal government. Do immigrants in each province reflect the same kinds of “alienation” from the federal government, and possibly weaker attachment to Canada, than their respective Canadian-born provincial counterparts?

The first indicator measures an affective dimension of political loyalties. Following Clarke and colleagues (1980) we examine respondents’ feelings toward Canada and their province of residence. Here, the focus is on the differences in immigrants’ feelings toward Canada and the respondents’ province. The first dependent variable is thus captured by a scale (ranging from $-1$ to $+1$) indicating whether respondents express a more positive feeling toward Canada than toward their province ($>0$), a more positive feeling toward their province than toward Canada ($<0$), or equal feelings toward Canada and their province ($=0$). The next two indicators measure evaluative dimensions of political loyalties. The second indicator captures the gap in respondents’ levels of political confidence between the federal and provincial governments. This scale (ranging from $-1$ to $+1$) indicates whether respondents express more confidence in the federal government than in the provincial government ($>0$), more confidence in the provincial government than in the federal government ($<0$), or equal confidence in the federal and provincial governments ($=0$). The third indicator measures respondents’ perceptions of whether their province is treated better ($+1$), worse ($-1$) or about the same (0) as other provinces by the federal government.

Following conventional practice (Clarke et al., 1980), we also include a behavioural dimension of political loyalties and examine which party immigrants tend to support. The conventional wisdom is that immigrants typically support the Liberal party of Canada (Blais, 2005; Bilodeau and Kanji, 2010), but what is far less clear is whether that support is uniformly distributed or varies substantially across provinces. Given that recent elections have produced major regional variations in partisan preferences (Gidengil et al., 1999; Blais et al., 2002; Nevitte et al., 2000) the relevant question to ask is whether partisan support among immigrants follows those regional lines or whether immigrants are more likely to vote Liberal regardless of region of residence. Precisely why immigrants have tended in the past to rally behind the Liberal party is not entirely clear but some scholars speculate that the Liberal party might attract immigrant voters because it is perceived as the party most committed to pro-
moting the multiculturalism agenda in Canada, an issue potentially important to immigrants when making their vote choice (Bilodeau and Kanji, 2010). Consequently, our focus is specifically on provincial variation in immigrants’ voting for the Liberal party of Canada.

These questions are empirically explored with pooled data from the 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004 and 2006 Canadian Election Studies (CES). For reasons of sample size and population distribution, the analyses are limited to the immigrant-rich provinces of Ontario, Quebec, Alberta and British Columbia. Table 1 presents the sample composition for each group of respondents for each of the four provinces. The analyses control for such socio-demographic variables as sex, age, education, income and employment to take into account the possibility that potential differences between immigrants and Canadian-born respondents might be attributable to socio-structural variation between these subpopulations. Furthermore, because it is possible that feelings toward Canada and the provinces, levels of confidence in provincial and federal governments, perception of the province treatment by the federal government and the propensity of voting for the Liberal party of Canada varied across elections between 1993 and 2006, the analyses also control for the election year in which respondents were interviewed. (For detailed information about variable construction, see appendix A.)

### Immigrants’ Federal and Provincial Loyalties

The first step entails determining whether immigrants in each of the four provinces exhibit political loyalties that are more provincially or federally oriented than the Canadian-born population in the province where they reside. The descriptive findings are presented in Table 2 and the summary results from the multivariate analyses, which compare for each province the political loyalties of immigrants from traditional and non-traditional source countries with those of Canadian-born citizens, are presented in Table 3. The full multivariate results are reported in appendix B.

### Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample Distribution and Size by Province</th>
<th>Quebec</th>
<th>Ontario</th>
<th>Alberta</th>
<th>British Columbia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canadian-Born Population</td>
<td>4403</td>
<td>4004</td>
<td>1731</td>
<td>1850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional Immigrants</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>468</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Traditional Immigrants</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data reported in Table 2 indicate that there are significant differences in respondents’ feelings towards Canada and their province between the immigrant and Canadian-born population in Quebec. About 23 per cent of the Canadian-born population in Quebec express more positive feelings toward Canada than Quebec, but those proportions climb to 43 per cent and 39 per cent among immigrants from traditional and non-traditional source countries respectively in that province. The multivariate analysis reported in Table 3 support these descriptive results. Everything else being equal, immigrants from traditional source countries score, on average, more than .10 point higher than Canadian-born residents of Quebec on the −1 to 1 scale. And immigrants from non-

### Table 2
Outlooks of Immigrants and the Canadian-born Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Quebec</th>
<th>Ontario</th>
<th>Alberta</th>
<th>British Columbia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Feelings about Canada - Province (1997 &amp; 2000 CES)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(% of people with stronger feelings for Canada than for their province)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian-born population</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional sources</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-traditional sources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1699)</td>
<td>(1491)</td>
<td>(1188)</td>
<td>(659)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Confidence in Federal-Provincial Governments (1993–2004 CES)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(% with greater confidence in federal than provincial government)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian-born population</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants</td>
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<td>28</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional sources</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-traditional sources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1474)</td>
<td>(1698)</td>
<td>(1376)</td>
<td>(793)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(% who believe their province is treated better than other provinces)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian-born population</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>Immigrants</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>Traditional sources</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-traditional sources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4434)</td>
<td>(4555)</td>
<td>(3396)</td>
<td>(2158)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(% who believe their province is treated worse than other provinces)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian-born population</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>58</td>
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<td>Immigrants</td>
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<td>60</td>
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<tr>
<td>Traditional sources</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>47</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-traditional sources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4434)</td>
<td>(4555)</td>
<td>(3396)</td>
<td>(2158)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Proportion of Liberal Voting (%) (1993–2006 CES)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian-born population</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-traditional sources</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>(2719)</td>
<td>(3140)</td>
<td>(2313)</td>
<td>(1496)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1Mail-back component of the Canadian Election Studies.
traditional source countries score about .08 point higher on average than the Canadian-born Quebec population.

That pattern, however, is not replicated in the other provinces under consideration. For example, there is no discernable difference between immigrants from traditional source countries and the Canadian-born populations in Ontario, Alberta or British Columbia, or between immigrants from non-traditional source countries and the Canadian-born population in British Columbia. The only other significant difference to emerge is in Ontario, where according to the multivariate analysis, immigrants from non-traditional source countries express less positive feelings for Canada than for their province in comparison to the local population (.03 point lower than their Canadian-born provincial counterpart). In Alberta, immigrants from non-traditional source countries also appear more likely to express positive feeling toward Canada than the local Albertan population (see Table 2) but this finding is not replicated in the multivariate analysis (see Table 3).

Thus, the Quebec results diverge significantly from others when it comes to the affective loyalty of immigrants. Immigrants from both tra-
ditional and non-traditional source countries, express more federally oriented loyalties than the Canadian-born population of their respective province. This result may not be so surprising given that it is in Quebec, according to the descriptive results, that we find the largest proportion of the Canadian-born population expressing more positive feelings for their province than for Canada: 42 per cent of Canadian born Quebeckers view their province more positively than Canada, compared to 21 per cent of Canadian-born Albertans or British Columbians and 9 per cent of Ontarians.\(^6\) It is nevertheless striking to see that this more positive feeling toward Quebec than Canada is not transferred very efficiently to immigrants; only 16 per cent of immigrants from traditional and 24 per cent from non-traditional source countries respectively express a more positive feeling for Quebec than for Canada.\(^7\)

When it comes to expressions of confidence in governments, there are no discernable differences between immigrants and local populations in each of the four provinces. Immigrants in Quebec and Ontario are somewhat more likely to express greater confidence in the federal than in their provincial government. But as the multivariate results reported in Table 3 indicate, these differences are not statistically significant. The only statistically significant difference observed in Table 3 concerns immigrants from traditional source countries in Alberta; this group seems less federally oriented than the local population. When it comes to confidence in these institutions, immigrants are not, on balance, more federally oriented than their respective Canadian-born counterparts, even in Quebec.\(^8\)

The differences between immigrant and Canadian-born populations, however, are larger and more numerous when it comes to evaluations of how the federal government treats provinces. Immigrants from non-traditional source countries in Alberta and British Columbia supply significantly more favourable evaluations of the role played by the federal government than do Canadian-born respondents. Some 48 per cent of native-born Alberta residents and 51 per cent of immigrants from traditional source countries believe that Alberta receives worse treatment than other provinces from the federal government. That proportion drops to just 31 per cent among immigrants from non-traditional source countries. The distribution of responses in British Columbia, 58 per cent, 60 per cent and 47 per cent, respectively, replicate the same pattern and these findings are supported by the multivariate analyses in Table 3. Immigrants from traditional source countries in Alberta and British Columbia express similar evaluations to those of the local populations of the treatment received by their respective province from the federal government. Immigrants from non-traditional source countries in these two provinces, however, are significantly more inclined to express more positive evaluations than the local populations.
Once again, it is the Quebec findings that turn out to be most striking. In that province, immigrants from both traditional and non-traditional source countries are more likely than their Canadian-born co-residents to think that Quebec receives fair treatment from the federal government. Thirty-three per cent of non-immigrant Quebeckers think that their province receives worse treatment from the federal government than other provinces, while 20 per cent of immigrants from traditional and 25 per cent of those from non-traditional source countries share that view. Only 10 per cent of non-immigrant Quebeckers believe that their province receives better treatment from the federal government than other provinces while more than twice as many immigrants from traditional (22 per cent) and non-traditional (24 per cent) source countries hold that view.

Given the previous findings it comes as no surprise to discover that it is Ontarians who express the most positive evaluations of how the federal government treats their province. In that setting, 29 per cent of non-immigrant respondents think that the federal government treats their province better than other provinces. That finding contrasts sharply with the views held by comparable groups in Quebec (10 per cent), Alberta (5 per cent), and British Columbia (4 per cent). And it is only in Ontario that both groups of immigrants and the Canadian-born population share the same evaluations.9

A similar pattern of differences between the immigrant and Canadian-born populations in each of the provinces emerges with respect to partisan support. Blais (2005) and Bilodeau and Kanji (2010) demonstrate that Canadians of non-European origins are more likely than other Canadians to support the Liberal party of Canada. Our analyses indicate that this holds for the most part in the four provinces examined. Descriptive data reported in Table 2 indicate that the propensity to vote Liberal among immigrants from non-traditional source countries is 37 points higher than among the local population in Quebec, 18 points higher in British Columbia, 16 points higher in Ontario and 9 points higher in Alberta. Quebec emerges yet again as an outlier. Furthermore, Quebec also distinguishes itself from other provinces when it comes to the case of immigrants from traditional source countries. Immigrants from traditional source countries are almost as likely as Canadian-born respondents to express support for the Liberal party in British Columbia and Ontario and they are even less likely to do so in Alberta. Immigrants from traditional source countries in Quebec, however, are significantly more likely than the local Quebec population to support the Liberal party (by 24 percentage points). All of these findings are confirmed by the multivariate analyses.

These initial findings indicate that new Canadians, and more particularly newer waves of immigrants from countries with social and political systems that are vastly different from Canada’s, tend to exhibit political loyalties that are more federally oriented than those of Canadian-born
populations. They evaluate more positively the federal governments’ treatment of their province and they are also more likely to support the Liberal party of Canada. The discrepancies between immigrant and Canadian-born populations are most pronounced in Quebec and generally least pronounced in Ontario than elsewhere. The most striking finding, perhaps, concerns the extent to which both groups of immigrants in Quebec differ from their Canadian-born counterparts in that province. Elsewhere, it is mostly only immigrants from non-traditional source countries that differ from the Canadian-born population. These initial results suggest that immigrant populations do have the potential to alter regional cleavages in loyalties to the federal and provincial governments.

**Do Immigrants Reproduce Regional Cleavages in Political Loyalties?**

The preceding analysis sheds some light on the question of immigrants’ integration in regional dynamics but it provides only a partial view of how newcomers shape the dynamics of regionalism. Do immigrants reproduce regional cleavages in political loyalties? That question is explored by analyzing the data from each of our three subgroups of citizens (Canadian-born, immigrants from traditional and non-traditional source countries) in a multivariate setup. At issue is the direction and size of the differences in political loyalties between Canadian-born residents in Quebec, Ontario, Alberta and British Columbia and the question of whether these differences are replicated when immigrants of all four provinces are compared. For instance, if non-immigrant Albertans evaluate their provincial government more positively than their counterparts in Ontario, then the expectation is that immigrants in Alberta would also evaluate their provincial government more positively than their counterparts in Ontario. As before, these comparisons are undertaken for both groups of immigrants separately. The core findings are summarized in Table 4. The full specification is presented in appendix B. In these tables and analyses, respondents from Quebec, Alberta and British Columbia are each compared to those from Ontario.

For the most part regional outlooks are reproduced among immigrants, notwithstanding the differences between immigrant and Canadian-born populations within provinces observed in the previous section of the analyses. Consider first the data concerning interprovincial differences in confidence in federal and provincial governments. The differences observed between non-immigrant Quebeckers, Albertans and British Columbians with Ontarians are almost exactly replicated among both groups of immigrants. For instance, the gap between non-immigrant respondents of Quebec, Alberta and British Columbia with Ontario are
The Development of Dual Loyalties

TABLE 4
Differences between Provinces (by subgroup)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Quebec</th>
<th>Alberta</th>
<th>British Columbia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Canada—Province Feelings (−1 to 1)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian-born population</td>
<td>−.12***</td>
<td>−.02***</td>
<td>−.03***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants from traditional source countries</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>−.02</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants from non-traditional source countries</td>
<td>−.01</td>
<td>−.00</td>
<td>−.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gap in Confidence between Federal and Provincial Governments (−1 to +1)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian-born population</td>
<td>−.09***</td>
<td>−.13***</td>
<td>.03***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants from traditional source countries</td>
<td>−.08*</td>
<td>−.21***</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants from non-traditional source countries</td>
<td>−.05</td>
<td>−.14***</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Perception of Province Treatment by the Federal Government (−1 to +1)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian-born population</td>
<td>−.35***</td>
<td>−.54***</td>
<td>−.63***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants from traditional source countries</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>−.47***</td>
<td>−.55***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants from non-traditional source countries</td>
<td>−.14**</td>
<td>−.30***</td>
<td>−.42***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Proportion of Liberal Voting</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian-born population</td>
<td>−.70***</td>
<td>−.98***</td>
<td>−.77***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants from traditional source countries</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>−1.71***</td>
<td>−.97***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants from non-traditional source countries</td>
<td>−.07</td>
<td>−1.21***</td>
<td>−.76***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Entries report unstandardized B coefficients based on OLS regressions (and logit regression in the case of Liberal Voting) controlling for age, sex, education, income, employment status and year of interview. See appendix B for full tables. Coefficients correspond to predicted differences between each group of respondents (Canadian-born respondents, immigrants from traditional source countries, and immigrants from non-traditional source countries) with its counterpart in Ontario.

***: B significant at p<.01; **: B significant at p<.05; *: B significant at p<.10.

respectively −.09, −.13 and .03 and those observed among immigrants from non-traditional source countries are respectively −.05, −.14 and .00. The structure of regional cleavages, then, appears to be replicated among newcomers.10

The same broad findings emerge from the analysis of the three other indicators for Ontario, Alberta and British Columbia. First, there are only small differences in feelings toward Canada and the provinces among the non-immigrant populations and a similar pattern is observed among immigrants. Second, native-born Albertans and British Columbians tend to evaluate more negatively than local Ontarians the treatment their province receives from the federal government. The same holds among both types of immigrants in these respective provinces. And third, non-immigrant Albertans and British Columbians are less likely to vote for the Liberal party than their counterparts in Ontario. That same pattern is
also reflected among immigrants of these respective provinces. The regional cleavages observed among immigrants in Ontario, Alberta and British Columbia on these three dimensions, however, do not precisely correspond to those of their native-born counterparts. Rather, the regional cleavages observed among immigrants tend to be more moderate than among the local populations when it comes to feelings toward Canada and the province, and when it comes to the perceptions of how the province is treated by the federal government. Moreover, the regional differences tend to be even less pronounced among immigrants from non-traditional source countries particularly when it comes to evaluations of province treatment by the federal government. Thus, for instance, while the predicted differences between local Albertans and Ontarians in perception of the treatment received by the province from the federal government is \(-0.54\), the predicted difference is \(-0.47\) for immigrants from traditional source countries and \(-0.30\) for immigrants from non-traditional source countries.

The final core finding that emerges from the data presented in Table 4 concerns Quebec. As with the initial findings, it appears that provincial loyalties are least efficiently transmitted from the Canadian-born population to both traditional and non-traditional immigrants in Quebec. Canadian-born Quebeckers score approximately .12 point lower than their Ontario counterparts on the Canada/province thermometer. The corresponding gaps for immigrants from traditional and non-traditional source countries, however, are just .02 and \(-0.01\) points respectively, and they are not statistically significant. Similarly, Canadian-born Quebeckers are significantly less likely than their Ontario counterparts to view the federal government’s treatment of their province favourably (\(-0.35\)). But there is no corresponding chasm between immigrants from traditional (0.02) and non-traditional source countries (\(-0.14\)). Finally, neither group of immigrants replicate the regional cleavages observed between local Quebeckers and Ontarians when it comes to the matter of support for the Liberal party. Certainly, local Quebeckers are significantly less likely to vote for the Liberal party than their Ontario counterparts (\(-0.70\)) but the same cannot be said for immigrants from traditional (0.27) and non-traditional source countries (\(-0.07\)).

Explaining the Case of Quebec: Language Matters

Immigrants in Quebec, evidently, hold patterns of outlooks that are strikingly different from those of their counterparts in Ontario, Alberta and British Columbia. That finding requires closer scrutiny. And one candidate explanation for these variations might concern the role of language. To explore that possibility we compare 1) the political loyalties of immi-
grants who speak French at home to those of the native-born population in Quebec and 2) the political loyalties of immigrants who speak either English or another language (other than French) at home to the native-born population in Quebec. In both comparisons we continue to distinguish between immigrants from traditional and non-traditional source countries. Table 5 reports the results of these multivariate analyses. These findings should be interpreted cautiously, given the modest samples of immigrants available for the analyses (N = 186 and 214, respectively, for immigrants who speak French and English or another language).

The analyses suggest distinct patterns of political integration, depending on which language immigrants speak at home. For three of the four types of orientations examined immigrants who speak English or another language at home exhibit political loyalties significantly different from those of the native-born population in Quebec. That pattern holds for both immigrants from traditional and non-traditional source countries. By contrast, immigrants who speak French at home exhibit political loyalties similar to those of the local population. There are no discernable differences in the orientations of French-speaking immigrants from traditional source countries and the native-born population in Quebec. And although French-speaking immigrants from non-traditional source countries are more likely than the native-born population of Quebec to support the Liberal party, the difference in party support is quite modest when compared to their counterparts who speak English or another language.

These tentative findings suggest that the dynamics of immigrants’ integration in Quebec are different from those of immigrants in other provinces and that integration in Quebec appears to follow lines of linguistic integration. Immigrants who speak French at home tend to develop political loyalties that are similar to those of the local population. By contrast, those who speak English or another language at home tend to exhibit orientations that are more federal than those of the local population. These findings are consistent with other research showing that, when it comes to support for the Parti Québécois or support for Quebec sovereignty, the patterns of support within French-speaking ethnic communities are more similar to those of the native-born Quebec population than those from other ethnic communities who do not speak French (Lavoie and Serré, 2002).

Concluding Discussion

Citizen outlooks towards their federal and provincial governments are a primary prism for understanding the dynamics of regionalism in Canada. Most Canadians are socialized to these dualities, but what about new Canadians? The significant changes in the scale, distribution and com-
### Table 5
Difference between Immigrants and Canadian-born Population in Quebec

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Gap in Canada and Province Feelings (−1 to 1)</th>
<th>Gap in Confidence between Federal and Prov. Govts. (−1 to +1)</th>
<th>Province Treatment by Federal Government (−1 to +1)</th>
<th>Liberal Vote (0–1)</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>French-Speaking Immigrants</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional Immigrants</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Traditional Immigrants</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>−.01</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>English and Other Language Speaking Immigrants</strong></td>
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</tr>
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<td>Traditional Immigrants</td>
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<td>.06</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Traditional Immigrants</td>
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<td>.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
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<td>.02</td>
<td>−.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
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<td>Election 1993</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election 1997</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election 2000</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>−.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election 2004</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>−.06</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>.05</td>
<td>−.17</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R-square/Cox and Snell</td>
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<td>1.2</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>8.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1540</td>
<td>1363</td>
<td>3895</td>
<td>2433</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Entries report unstandardized B coefficients based on OLS regressions for Canada and province feeling, gap in confidence between federal and provincial governments and province treatment received by federal government and B coefficient based on logistic regression for Liberal voting.

a: B significant at p<.01; b: B significant at p<.05; c: B significant at p<.10.
position of Canada’s immigrant population raise the question of how these changes contribute to the dynamics of regionalism in the country. The analysis began by investigating whether immigrants adopt political outlooks that are more federally or provincially oriented than the Canadian-born population. It then turned to evaluate whether new immigration dynamics have the potential to transform the structure of cleavages in federal–provincial orientations between Canada’s provinces. Almost 30 years ago, Elkins reported that immigrants who arrived in Canada in the 1940s and 1950s exhibited relatively weak regional differences in such core orientations as political efficacy and trust. Canadian immigration patterns have changed quite substantially since then. Even so, the conclusions emerging from this analysis corroborate Elkins’ findings with respect to other core features of political culture. For the most part, immigrants do reproduce the structure of interprovincial cleavages. But a significant caveat is in order: the cleavages observed among immigrants, especially those among immigrants from non-traditional source countries, are weaker than those found among the Canadian-born population. Contemporary immigration thus appears to have the potential to continue to slowly erode regional cleavages.

We presented at the outset two competing sets of expectations about immigrants’ acquisition of federal–provincial orientations. The first possibility explored was that immigrants’ federal–provincial loyalties essentially reflect those of their new provincial context. The alternative possibility was that immigrants acquire loyalties that are more federally oriented than those of the local population, regardless of province of residence. On balance, the data support the latter interpretation: immigrants tend to exhibit political loyalties that are somewhat more federally oriented than those of the Canadian-born population. And these federally oriented outlooks are particularly striking among a growing segment of the immigrant population, namely, those coming from non-traditional source countries. However, the fact that immigrants develop somewhat stronger federal loyalties than the Canadian-born population in their respective provinces does not imply that they are completely impervious to local dynamics. The analyses indicate that in spite of the difference between immigrants and their corresponding Canadian-born provincial population, there is clear evidence of a strong reproduction of regional cleavages.

The expectation that immigrants might be inclined to evaluate the federal pole more positively was informed by the special features of immigrant adaptation. If immigrants choose strategies for adjusting to new environments that lower the costs of adaptation, (see Berry et al., 1987; Berry, 1997), then the federal governments’ multiculturalism policy might offer them a promising pole of identification. Immigrants, especially those from non-traditional source countries, plausibly might identify with the policy of multiculturalism of the federal government, a policy that explic-
itly recognizes cultural specificity and encourages the retention of cultural difference. This attraction would then lead to greater attachment to the federal pole of loyalty. The data, however, do not allow us to pinpoint the specific reasons for why newcomers develop stronger loyalties to the federal government and so the precise origins of this stronger attachment remain open for debate and for future research.

The Quebec case suggests, clearly, that regardless of the salience of the multiculturalism policy explanation, other factors are at play in immigrants’ integration dynamics. Of the four provinces examined, Quebec turns out to exhibit exceptional patterns. As in other provinces, Quebec immigrants from non-traditional source countries exhibit political loyalties more federally oriented than those of the local population. And uniquely, immigrants from traditional source countries in Quebec also exhibit more federally oriented loyalties.

The Quebec case seems to present counterintuitive findings. Of all Canadian provinces it is Quebec that most actively promotes policies to ensure immigrants’ integration. Bill 101 requires French education. Quebec was also the first province to sign an agreement in 1991 with the federal government giving the province a greater role in the selection of their immigrants. And through this agreement Quebec has the opportunity to favour francophone immigrants. Most significantly, perhaps, Quebec has a policy of *interculturalisme* to address its cultural and ethnic diversity, one that is substantively similar to the federal government’s multiculturalism policy (Kymlicka, 1998: 67–68; Gagnon and Iacovino, 2004). The collective impact of these policies might facilitate more efficient integration to Quebec society. Yet it is in Quebec that the immigrant population carries political outlooks that are most at odds with those of the native-born provincial population, and in that sense it is in Quebec that immigration has the greatest potential to attenuate Canadian regional cleavages.

Our analyses of the role of language suggest that the absorption of federal–provincial loyalties in Quebec is consistent with patterns of linguistic integration. Immigrants who speak French at home develop political loyalties that are almost indistinguishable from those of the local population while those of immigrants who speak English at home or another language are significantly more federally oriented. A determining factor in Quebec, then, appears to be immigrants’ choice of which linguistic community they join.

One question raised by these findings concerns the matter of whether the impact of immigration on regional dynamics is short-lived or long-term. To answer this question definitively required a detailed investigation of whether immigrants’ political loyalties evolve or remain more federally oriented the longer they reside in Canada. To this point, the limits of the data make it difficult to address that question directly or in detail.13
Canadian political culture has been substantially shaped by the series of immigration waves that settled in the country in the last centuries. Whether they came from France, the British colonies, Central and Eastern Europe and Asia, immigrants have made a significant contribution to determining how Canadians relate to politics and their political institutions. This paper presents evidence suggesting that today’s immigrants, like their predecessors, are indeed forging contemporary regional dynamics in Canada. Immigrants, especially newer waves from non-traditional source countries, seem to develop somewhat stronger federal political loyalties, even if they also absorb regional political norms to a significant degree. The specific reasons why this is so and whether these differences are sustained or diminish with time, remain to be demonstrated, but in the meantime it appears that immigration to Canadian provinces has some potential to dilute regional cleavages in federal–provincial political orientations as Elkins (1980) had shown close to three decades ago. It strengthens what LaSelva (1996) characterized as the “will to live together” within the Canadian confederation.

Notes

1 A related area of contention is boundaries of regions. For some, provinces are useful boundaries because they are “analytically distinct political systems” (Simeon and Elkins, 1974: 400; see also Schwartz, 1974; Wilson, 1974), while for others (MacDermid, 1990; Henderson, 2004) socio-demographic boundaries are more appropriate because they are the “constituent units of culture” (Henderson, 2004: 602).

2 Clarke and colleagues examine affective, cognitive, evaluative and behavioural expressions of political loyalties among the Canadian-born population. It is not possible in this paper to examine in a reliable fashion the cognitive (knowledge-based) expression of political loyalty. There are simply too few items in the Canadian Election Studies that allow us to reliably measure knowledge of provincial politics and hence to compare immigrants’ knowledge of federal and provincial politics.

3 There are other potential explanations to account for immigrants’ support for the Liberal party; Blais (2005), however, casts significant doubt on explanations emphasizing differences in socio-economic status and in a number of specific policy preferences. Blais finds no discernable differences in opinion between immigrants and Canadian-born citizens when it comes to multiculturalism policy but he does not examine how salient that issue is in shaping party support among immigrants.

4 Because the Bloc Québécois is found only in Québec and because the Reform Party was replaced subsequently by the Canadian Alliance and the Conservative Party of Canada, it is difficult to also examine support for these parties.

5 Note that the indicators for feelings toward Canada and the respondents’ province are available only for the 1997 and 2000 Canadian Election Studies. Moreover, the indicators for confidence in federal and provincial governments are not available for the 2006 Canadian Election Study and, when available, these question items have been asked in the mail-back components of the survey. Consequently, the sample sizes for these confidence items are smaller. For more information on the Canadian Election Studies, visit: http://ces-eec.org/pagesE/home.html

6 These descriptive data are not presented in Table 2.
These descriptive data are not presented in Table 2.

The descriptive findings for the proportions of respondents who report greater confidence in the provincial than federal governments do not reveal more significant patterns.

In three provinces, it also appears that immigrants from non-traditional source countries are more likely than either traditional source immigrants or Canadian-born citizens to say that the federal government gives a similar treatment to all provinces: Ontario (60 versus 50 and 52 per cent, respectively) in Alberta (60 versus 43 and 47 per cent, respectively) and in British Columbia (42 versus 36 and 38 per cent, respectively). The only exception in this regard is Quebec (53 versus 56 and 57 per cent, respectively). We reproduced the analyses presented in Table 3 using an alternate specification of the “province treatment” variable that contrasts respondents who believe their province receives a “lesser” treatment (0) to those who believe their province receive a “better” or “equal” treatment (1). The results of this alternate specification replicate those presented in Table 3.

The coefficients among immigrants are not always statistically significant; this is probably because of the small sample sizes for the immigrant analyses.

Note that in 2004 and 2006 we rely on the first language learned and still understood by immigrants. The 2004 and 2006 CES did not ask respondents for the language they speak at home.

This interpretation is supported by further analyses revealing no differences between the political loyalties of immigrants who speak English or another language and native-born residents of Quebec who speak English or another language (results not presented).

Even with pooled CES data, the resulting samples of immigrants are too small to conduct reliable multivariate analyses. Exploratory investigations were conducted by dividing immigrants from non-traditional source countries into three groups (who have lived in Canada for 10 years or less, who have lived in Canada for 11 to 20 years, and who have lived in Canada for more than 20 years), and then comparing the political loyalties of these groups to those of the Canadian-born population in their respective provinces (No analyses were performed for immigrants from traditional source countries). Only a small proportion of immigrants in the CES sample have lived in Canada for less than 10 years. The tentative conclusion suggested by these data is that the impact of contemporary immigration on regional cleavages in political outlooks seems short-lived. The differences in federal–provincial orientations between immigrants from non-traditional source countries and the Canadian-born population within each province appear to diminish the longer immigrants have lived in Canada. This finding is consistent with those of other studies demonstrating significant changes in immigrants’ political orientations with the passage of time (White et al., 2008).

References


### Appendix A: Construction of Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1993–2006 Canadian Election Studies</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gap in Canada and Province Feelings</td>
<td>(-1) to (1) scale: (1) = respondents feel strongly more positive toward Canada than their province; (-1) = respondents feel strongly more positive about their province than about Canada.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gap in confidence between federal and provincial Governments</td>
<td>(-1) to (+1) scale: (&gt;0) = respondents express more confidence in the federal government than in the provincial one; (0) = equal confidence in both federal and provincial governments; (&lt;0) = respondents express more confidence in the provincial government than in the federal one.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception of province treatment by the federal government</td>
<td>Three-category variable: (1) = respondents believe that their province is treated better than other provinces by the federal government; (0) = province is treated the same as other provinces, and (-1) = province is treated worse than other provinces by the federal government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Vote</td>
<td>Dichotomous variable: (1) = voted Liberal; (0) = voted for another party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>(1): at best finished primary school; (2): at best finished high school; (3): at least some post-secondary education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Age in years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>(1) = female, (0) = male.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>Household income in quintiles (5) = highest; (1) = lowest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>(1) = full time or part time employed, (0) = all others.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants from traditional source countries</td>
<td>Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, USA, Ukraine,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants from non-traditional source countries</td>
<td>Albania, Argentina, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, Bosnia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Central/South America, Chile, China, Columbia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech, Dominican, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jamaica, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Macedonia, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, St-kits/Nevits, St-Vincent de Grenadine, Taiwan, Trinidad, Turkey, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yugoslavia, Zimbabwe, Other African Country, Other Asian Country, Other European country, Other Middle Eastern Country, and Other South American Country.</td>
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</table>
Appendix B

### TABLE B1
Difference between Immigrants and Canadian-born Populations in Gap in Canada and Province Feelings

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<tr>
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<th>Quebec B</th>
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<tr>
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<td>.02</td>
</tr>
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<td>-.03</td>
<td>.01(^b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>.00</td>
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</tr>
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<td>-.01</td>
<td>.00(^c)</td>
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Source: 1997 and 2000 Canadian Election Studies. \(a: P<0.01\); \(b: P<0.05\); \(c: P<0.10\).

Entries report OLS unstandardized coefficients.

### TABLE B2
Difference between Immigrants and Canadian-born Population in Gap in Confidence between Federal and Provincial Governments

<table>
<thead>
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<th></th>
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<th>Ontario B</th>
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<td>.01</td>
</tr>
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<td>.00(^a)</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.00(^a)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.00</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Election 2004</td>
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<td>.02(^a)</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
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<td>.05(^a)</td>
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<td>1544</td>
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Source: 1993, 1997, 2000 and 2004 Canadian Election Studies. \(a: P<0.01\); \(b: P<0.05\); \(c: P<0.10\) Entries report OLS unstandardized coefficients.
Table B3
Difference between Immigrants and Canadian-born Population in Evaluations of province Treatment by the Federal Government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province Treatment by Federal Government (−1 to +1)</th>
<th>Quebec</th>
<th>Ontario</th>
<th>Alberta</th>
<th>British Columbia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
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<tr>
<td>Traditional Immigrants</td>
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<td>.06*</td>
<td>−.03</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.05*</td>
<td>−.03</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Traditional Immigrants</td>
<td>−.02</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.02*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.02*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>−.02</td>
<td>.01*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>−.01</td>
<td>.00*</td>
</tr>
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<td>.01</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
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<td>−.28</td>
<td>.04*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.03b</td>
<td>−.07</td>
<td>.03b</td>
</tr>
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<td>Election 2000</td>
<td>−.05</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.03*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Election 2004</td>
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<td>.23</td>
<td>.08*</td>
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<td>3.4</td>
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<td>3905</td>
<td>2944</td>
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a: P<0.01; b: P<0.05; c: P<0.10 Entries report OLS unstandardized coefficients.
TABLE B4
Difference between Immigrants and the Canadian-born Population in Liberal Voting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Liberal Vote (0–1)</th>
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<th>British Columbia</th>
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</thead>
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<td>SE</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
</tr>
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<td>.08c</td>
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<td>.04</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
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<td>.01</td>
<td>.00a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>.11</td>
</tr>
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<td>.12a</td>
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Source: 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004 and 2006 Canadian Election Studies. a: P<0.01; b: P<0.05; c: P<0.10
Entries report logit estimates.
## Table B4.1
Reproduction of Regional Cleavages among Immigrants in Canada (Part 1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Gap in Canada and Province Feelings (−1 to 1)</th>
<th>Gap in Confidence between Federal and Prov. Govts. (−1 to +1)</th>
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<td>ALB (vs. Ontario)</td>
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<td>.01(^a)</td>
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<td>.01(^b)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education</td>
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<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>−.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>−.01</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election 1993</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election 1997</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election 2000</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.01(^a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted/PseudoR(^2)</td>
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<td>292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>3860</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^a\)P<0.01; \(^b\)P<0.05; \(^c\)P<0.10 Entries report OLS unstandardized coefficients.
### TABLE B4.2
Reproduction of Regional Cleavages among Immigrants in Canada (Part 2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province Treatment by Federal Government (−1 to +1)</th>
<th>Liberal Vote (0–1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B  SE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec (vs. Ontario)</td>
<td>−.35 .02&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BC (vs. Ontario)</td>
<td>−.63 .02&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALB (vs. Ontario)</td>
<td>−.54 .02&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>.04 .01&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.02 .01&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>−.01 .01&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>−.01 .00&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>−.01 .02&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election 1993</td>
<td>−.02 .02&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election 1997</td>
<td>.04 .02&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election 2000</td>
<td>−.01 .02&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election 2004</td>
<td>.01 .02&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004 and 2006 Canadian Election Studies. a: P<0.01; b: P<0.05; c: P<0.10

Entries report OLS unstandardized coefficients for “Province Treatment” and Logit estimates for Liberal Voting.
LETTER

A 61-million-person experiment in social influence and political mobilization

Robert M. Bond1, Christopher J. Fariss1, Jason J. Jones2, Adam D. I. Kramer3, Cameron Marlow4, Jaime E. Settle1 & James H. Fowler1,4

Human behaviour is thought to spread through face-to-face social networks, but it is difficult to identify social influence effects in observational studies6–13, and it is unknown whether online social networks operate in the same way14–19. Here we report results from a randomized controlled trial of political mobilization messages delivered to 61 million Facebook users during the 2010 US congressional elections. The results show that the messages directly influenced political self-expression, information seeking and real-world voting behaviour of millions of people. Furthermore, the messages not only influenced the users who received them but also the users’ friends, and friends of friends. The effect of social transmission on real-world voting was greater than the direct effect of the messages themselves, and nearly all the transmission occurred between ‘close friends’ who were more likely to have a face-to-face relationship. These results suggest that strong ties are instrumental for spreading both online and real-world behaviour in human social networks.

Recent experimental studies14–16 have attempted to measure the causal effect of social influence online. At the same time, there is increasing interest in the ability to use online social networks to study and influence real-world behaviour17–19. However, online social networks are also made up of many ‘weak-tie’ relationships20 that may not facilitate social influence21, and some studies suggest that online communication may not be an effective medium for influence22. An open question is whether online networks, which harness social information from face-to-face networks, can be used effectively to increase the likelihood of behaviour change and social contagion.

One behaviour that has been proposed to spread through networks is the act of voting in national elections. Voter turnout is significantly correlated among friends, family members and co-workers in observational studies23–25. Voter mobilization efforts are effective at increasing turnout26, particularly those conducted face-to-face and those that appeal to social pressure27 and social identity28. There is also evidence from one face-to-face field experiment that voting is ‘contagious’, in the sense that mobilization can spread from person to person within two-person households29. Although anecdotal accounts suggest that online mobilization has made a big difference in recent elections30, a meta-analysis of email experiments suggests that online appeals to vote are ineffective31.

Voter mobilization experiments32–38 have shown that most methods of contacting potential voters have small effects (if any) on turnout rates, ranging from 1% to 10%. However, the ability to reach large populations online means that even small effects could yield behaviour changes for millions of people. Furthermore, as many elections are competitive, these changes could affect electoral outcomes. For example, in the 2000 US presidential election, George Bush beat Al Gore in Florida by 537 votes (less than 0.01% of votes cast in Florida). Had Gore won Florida, he would have won the election.

To test the hypothesis that political behaviour can spread through an online social network, we conducted a randomized controlled trial with all users of at least 18 years of age in the United States who accessed the Facebook website on 2 November 2010, the day of the US congressional elections. Users were randomly assigned to a ‘social message’ group, an ‘informational message’ group or a control group. The social message group (n = 60,055,176) was shown a statement at the top of their ‘News Feed’. This message encouraged the user to vote, provided a link to find local polling places, showed a clickable button reading ‘I Voted’, showed a counter indicating how many other Facebook users had previously reported voting, and displayed up to six small randomly selected ‘profile pictures’ of the user’s Facebook friends who had already clicked the I Voted button (Fig. 1). The informational message group (n = 611,044) was shown the message, poll information, counter and button, but they were not shown any faces of friends. The control group (n = 613,096) did not receive any message at the top of their News Feed.

The design of the experiment allowed us to assess the impact that the treatments had on three user actions; clicking the I Voted button, clicking the polling-place link and voting in the election. Clicking the I Voted button is similar to traditional measures of self-reported voting, but here users reported their vote to their social community rather than to a researcher. We therefore use this action to measure political self-expression, as it is likely to be affected by the extent to which a user desires to be seen as a voter by others. In contrast, social desirability should not affect other user actions in the same way. Clicking the polling-place link took users to a separate website that helped them to find a polling location, and this action was not reported to the user’s social community. We therefore use this action to measure a user’s desire to seek information about the election. Finally, we used a group-level process to study the validated voting behaviour of 6.3 million users matched to publicly available voter records (see Supplementary Information).

We first analyse direct effects. We cannot compare the treatment groups with the control group to assess the effect of the treatment on self-expression and information seeking, because the control group did not have the option to click an I Voted button or click on a polling-place link. However, we can compare the proportion of users between the two treatment groups to estimate the causal effect of seeing the faces of friends who have identified themselves as voters (Fig. 1). Users who received the social message were 2.08% (s.e.m., 0.05%; t-test, P < 0.01) more likely to click on the I Voted button than those who received the informational message (20.04% in the social message group versus 17.96% in the informational message group). Users who received the social message were also 0.26% (s.e.m., 0.02%; t-test, P < 0.01) more likely to click the polling-place information link than users who received the informational message (Fig. 1).

Although acts of political self-expression and information seeking are important in their own right, they do not necessarily guarantee that a particular user will actually vote. As such, we also measured the effect that the experimental treatment had on validated voting, through examination of public voting records. The results show that users

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who received the social message were 0.39% (s.e.m., 0.17%; t-test, P = 0.02) more likely to vote than users who received no message at all. Similarly, the difference in voting between those who received the social message and those who received the informational message was 0.39% (s.e.m., 0.17%; t-test, P = 0.02), suggesting that seeing faces of friends significantly contributed to the overall effect of the message on real-world voting. In fact, turnout among those who received the informational message was identical to turnout among those in the control group (treatment effect 0.00%, s.e.m., 0.28%; P = 0.98), which raises doubts about the effectiveness of information-only appeals to vote in this context.

These results show that online political mobilization can have a direct effect on political self-expression, information seeking and real-world voting behaviour, and that messages including cues from an individual’s social network are more effective than information-only appeals. But what about indirect effects that spread from person to person in the social network? Users in our sample had on average 149 Facebook friends, with whom they share social information, although many of these relationships constitute ‘weak ties’. Past research indicates that close friends have a stronger behavioural effect on each other than do acquaintances or strangers. We therefore expected mobilization to spread more effectively online through ‘strong ties’.

To distinguish users who are likely to have close relationships, we used the degree to which Facebook friends interacted with each other on the site (see Supplementary Information for more detail). Higher levels of interaction indicate that friends are more likely to be physically proximate and suggest a higher level of commitment to the friendship, more positive affect between the friends, and a desire for the friendship to be socially recognized. We counted the number of interactions between each pair of friends and categorized them by decile, ranking them from the lowest to highest percentage of interactions. A validation study (see Supplementary Information) shows that friends in the highest decile are those most likely to be close friends in real life (Fig. 2a).

We then used these categories to estimate the effect of the mobilization message on a user’s friends. Random assignment means that any relationship between the message a user receives and a friend’s behaviour is not due to shared attributes, as these attributes are not correlated with the treatment (see Supplementary Information). To measure a per-friend treatment effect, we compared behaviour in the friends connected to a user who received the social message to behaviour in the friends connected to a user in the control group. To account for dependencies in the network, we simulate the null distribution using a network permutation method (see the Supplementary Information). Monte Carlo simulations suggest that this method minimizes the risk of false positives and recovers true causal effects without bias (see Supplementary Information).

Figure 2 shows that the observed per-friend treatment effects increase as tie-strength increases. All of the observed treatment effects fall outside the null distribution for expressed vote (Fig. 2b), suggesting that they are significantly different from chance outcomes. For validated vote (Fig. 2c), the observed treatment effect is near zero for weak ties, but it spikes upwards and falls outside the null distribution for the top two deciles. This suggests that strong ties are important for the spread of real-world voting behaviour. Finally, the treatment effect for polling place search gradually increases (Fig. 2d), with several of the effects falling outside the 95% confidence interval of the null distribution.

To simplify the analysis and reporting of results, we arbitrarily define ‘close friends’ as people who were in the eightieth percentile or higher (decile 9) of frequency of interaction among all friendships in the sample (see the Supplementary Information). ‘Friends’ are all other Facebook friends who had less interaction. A total of 60,491,898 (98%) users in our sample had at least 1 close friend, with the average user having about 10 close friends (compared with an average of 139 friends who were not close).

The results suggest that users were about 0.011% (95% confidence interval (CI) of null distribution = 0.009% to 0.010%) more likely to engage in an act of political self-expression by clicking on the I Voted button than they would have been had their friend seen no message. Similarly, for each close friend who received the social message, an individual was on average 0.099% (null 95% CI = 0.042% to 0.048%) more likely to express voting.

We also found an effect in the validated vote sample. For each close friend who received the social message, a user was 0.224% (null 95% CI = 0.181% to 0.174%) more likely to vote than they would have been had their close friend received no message. Similarly, for information-seeking behaviour we found that for each close friend who received the social message, a user was 0.012% (null 95% CI = 0.012% to 0.12%) more likely to click the link to find their polling place than they would have been had their close friends received no message. In both cases there was no evidence that other friends had an effect (see Supplementary Information). Thus, ordinary Facebook friends may affect online expressive behaviour, but they do not seem to affect private or real-world political behaviours. In contrast, close friends seem to have influenced all three.

The magnitude of these contagion effects are small per friend, but it is important to remember that they result from a single message, and in many cases it was not possible to change the target’s behaviour. For example, users may have already voted by absentee ballot before Election Day, or they may have logged in to Facebook too late to vote or to influence other users’ voting behaviour. In other words, all effects measured here are intent-to-treat effects rather than treatment-on-treated effects, which would be greater if we had better information about who was eligible to receive the treatment.

Figure 1 | The experiment and direct effects. a, b. Examples of the informational message and social message Facebook treatments (a) and their direct effect on voting behaviour (b). Vertical lines indicate s.e.m. (they are too small to be seen for the first two bars).
Moreover, the scale of the number of users, their friendship connections and the potential voters in a given election is very large. We estimated the per-user effect (the per-friend effect multiplied by the average number of friends per user) and the total effect (the per-user effect multiplied by the total number of users) on the behaviour of everyone in the sample (see Supplementary Information). The results suggest that friends generated an additional 886,000 expressed votes (+1.4%, null 95% CI –1.1% to 1.1%), and close friends generated a further 559,000 votes (+0.9%, null 95% CI –0.3% to 0.3%). In the Supplementary Information we also show that close friends of close friends (2 degrees of separation) generated an additional 1 million expressed votes (+1.7%, null 95% CI –0.8% to 0.9%). Thus, the treatment clearly had a significant impact on political self-expression and how it spread through the network, and even weak ties seem to be relevant to its spread.

However, the effect of the social message on real-world validated vote behaviour and polling-place search was more focused. The results suggest that close friends generated an additional 282,000 validated votes (+1.8%, null 95% CI –1.3% to 1.2%) and an additional 74,000 polling-place searches (+0.1%, null 95% CI –0.1% to 0.1%), but there is no evidence that ordinary friends had any effect on either of these two behaviours. In other words, close friendships accounted for all of the significant contagion of these behaviours, in spite of the fact that they make up only 7% of all friendships on Facebook.

To put these results in context, it is important to note that turnout has been steadily increasing in recent US midterm elections, from 36.3% of the voting age population in 2002 to 37.2% in 2006, and to 37.8% in 2010. Our results suggest that the Facebook social message increased turnout directly by about 60,000 voters and indirectly through social contagion by another 280,000 voters, for a total of 340,000 additional votes. That represents about 0.14% of the voting age population of about 236 million in 2010. However, this estimate does not include the effect of the treatment on Facebook users who were registered to vote but who we could not match because of nicknames, typographical errors, and so on. It would be complex to estimate the number of users on Facebook who were in the voter record but unmatchable, and it is not clear whether treatment effects would be of the same magnitude for these individuals, so we restrict our estimate to the matched group that we were able to sample and observe. This means it is possible that more of the 0.60% growth in turnout between 2006 and 2010 might have been caused by a single message on Facebook.

The results of this study have many implications. First and foremost, online political mobilization works. It induces political self-expression, but it also induces information gathering and real, validated voter turnout. Although previous research suggested that online messages do not work19, it is possible that conventional sample sizes may not be large enough to detect the modest effect sizes shown here. We also show that social mobilization in online networks is significantly more effective than informational mobilization alone. Showing familiar faces to users can dramatically improve the effectiveness of a mobilization message.

Beyond the direct effects of online mobilization, we show the importance of social influence for effecting behaviour change. Our
validation study shows that close friends exerted about four times more influence on the total number of validated voters mobilized than the message itself. These results are similar to those from a prior network simulation study based on observational data that suggested each act of voting on average generates an additional three votes as this behaviour spreads through the network.\(^6\) Thus, efforts to influence behaviour should pay close attention not only to the effect a message will have on those who receive it but also to the likelihood that the message and the behaviour it spurs will spread from person to person through the social network. And, in contrast to the results for close friends, we find that Facebook friends have less effect. Online mobilization works because it primarily spreads through strong-tie networks that probably exist offline but have an online representation. In fact, it is plausible that unobserved face-to-face interactions account for at least some of the social influence that we observed in this experiment.

More broadly, the results suggest that online messages might influence a variety of offline behaviours, and this has implications for our understanding of the role of online social media in society. Experiments are expensive and have limited external validity, but the growing availability of cheap and large-scale online social network data\(^{17}\) means that these experiments can be easily conducted in the field. If we want to truly understand—and improve—our society, wellbeing and the world around us, it will be important to use these methods to identify which real world behaviours are amenable to online interventions.

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Supplementary Information is available in the online version of the paper.

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